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OVERVIEW: THE H-2 PROGRAM
Aliens in the Orchard: The Admission of
Foreign Contract Laborers for Temporary
Work in U.S. Agriculture
H. Michael Semler*
An employer may lawfully bring unskilled aliens to the United States
for temporary labor only pursuant to §§ 101(a)(15)(H)(ii) and 214' of
the Immigration and Nationality Act. 2 Approximately 30,000 aliens are
admitted under these provisions each year 3 to fill a wide variety of tem-
porary jobs. 4 This foreign labor program (commonly referred to as the
"H-2 program") has a major impact in certain agricultural markets.
Farm laborers constitute by far the largest single group of H-2 workers,
recently amounting to over thirty-five percent of all admissions.5 More-
* Senior Attorney, Migrant Legal Action Program, Washington, D.C.; J.D., University
of Chicago, 1972; B.S., Georgetown University, 1969. Copyright H. Michael Semler 1983.
1. Codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ I101(a)(15)(H)(ii) and 1184 (1976).
2. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (McCarran-Walters Act), as amended, 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1557 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
3. Annual H-2 admissions averaged 31,742 for the period 1974 through 1978, the five
most recent years for which final INS figures are available. The yearly H-2 admissions were:
40,883 (1974); 37,460 (1975); 29,778 (1976); 27,760 (1977); and 22,832 (1978). ANNUAL RE-
PORTS OF THE INS, 1974-1977, Table 16B; STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE INS 1978, Table
16B. The INS estimates that 30,000 H-2's were admitted in 1980. The H-2 Program and Aonim-
migrants. Hearings Before the Suaomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiaq, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1981) (statement of Alan Nelson, Deputy Commissioner,
INS).
4. The H-2 program is not limited by industry or type of employment. H-2 workers are
admitted individually or in small groups for temporary work in many professional, manage-
rial, clerical, service and labor categories, e.g., as accountants, mechanics, musicians, construc-
tion laborers and professional athletes. See, e.g., STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE INS 1978,
TABLE 16B.
5. ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE INS, 1976 AND 1977, TABLE 16B; STATISTICAL YEARBOOK
OF THE INS 1978, TABLE 16B. If admissions for Guam and the Virgin Islands are excluded,
farm laborers constitute 45-55% of all H-2 admissions. ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE INS, 1976
AND 1977, TABLE 16B AND 18.
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over, only in agriculture are contract workers admitted en masse to form
the dominant local workforce.
The H-2 program is currently the subject of intense controversy
among those concerned with agricultural, labor, and immigration poli-
cies. The routine admission of West Indian laborers has virtually closed
certain farm jobs in the Northeast and in Florida to U.S. workers. Fur-
ther, the H-2 program has recently expanded into new crops and loca-
tions, dramatically increasing the importation of Mexican contract
workers. The H-2 program has also emerged as a crucial element in the
ongoing Congressional effort to stem illegal immigration. The compre-
hensive immigration bill now before Congress, the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 19836, would amend the H-2 provisions to allow
greater access to temporary foreign workers, particularly for farm jobs in
the Southwest.
This article examines the operation of the H-2 program in agricul-
ture. Parts I through III discuss the statutory framework, the certifica-
tion system, and the current level of H-2 admissions. Part IV evaluates
the efforts of the Department of Labor (DOL), the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), and the federal judiciary to protect U.S.
farmworkers. The final section discusses whether the H-2 program is
needed, recommends revisions, and analyzes the amendments proposed
in the Immigration Reform and Control Act.
I. The Statutory Framework
An alien 7 is eligible for admission under § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii) if he or
she is "coming temporarily to the United States to perform temporary
services or labor" and "unemployed persons capable of performing such
service or labor cannot be found in this country."" Section 214 gives the
Attorney General final authority to determine whether any such alien
6. S. 529,98th Cong., 1st Sess.§211 (1983);H.R. 1510, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.§ 211 (1983).
7. An "alien" is "any person not a citizen or national of the United States." 8 U.S.C.
§ l101(a)(3) (1976). U.S. immigration law distinguishes between aliens seeking permanent
admission ("immigrants") and those seeking to remain in the U.S. only temporarily ("nonim-
migrants"). Aliens are deemed immigrants unless they fall within one of the nonimmigrant
classes listed in subsections A through M of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15). 8 U.S.C. § 1184(b)
(1976). See I C. GORDON AND H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.5b
(rev. ed. 1981).
Most aliens seeking permanent admission to the United States fall within numerical restric-
tions ("quotas"). 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (Supp. IV 1980). There are no numerical restrictions on
the admission of nonimmigrants.
8. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15)-(H) (ii) (1976). To be eligible for admission under any subsection
of § 101(a)(15)(H) an applicant must be "an alien having a residence in a foreign country
which he has no intention of abandoning." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H) (1976 & Supp. IV
1980).
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shall be admitted. 9 These two provisions constitute the complete statu-
tory authority supporting the temporary' 0 admission of unskilled labor-
ers for employment." Because this language is so succinct, the
Congressional intent must be drawn from the experience with contract
labor programs prior to 1952, the legislative history of the H-2 provi-
sions, and the unsuccessful effort to amend these provisions in 1965.
A. Contract Labor Prior to 1952
U.S. immigration law expressly barred unskilled contract workers
prior to 1952.12 This ban was consistently enforced for most non-agri-
9. (a) The admission to the United States of any alien as a nonimmigrant shall be
for such time and under such conditions as the Attorney General may by regulations
prescribe . ..
(c) The question of importing an alien as a nonimmigrant under [Section
101(a)(15)(H) or (L)] . ..shall be determined by the Attorney General, after consulta-
tion with appropriate agencies of the Government, upon petition of the importing em-
ployer. Such petition shall be made and approved before the visa is granted. The
petition shall be in such form and contain such information as the Attorney General
shall prescribe. The approval of such a petition shall not, of itself, be construed as estab-
lishing that the alien is a nonimmigrant.
8 U.S.C. § 1184(a) and (c) (1976).
10. Aliens may be admitted under the H-2 provisions only temporarily, and only for jobs
which are temporary. Matter of Contopoulas, 10 1. & N. Dec. 654 (1964); 1 C. GORDON AND
H. ROSENFIELD, .upra note 7, at § 2.14a.
Permanent admission for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor is governed
by the "permanent labor certification" requirement, which is distinct from the H-2 program
in terms of statutory language, decision-making authority, and governing regulations. See 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14); 20 C.F.R. Part 656 (1982). See also Rodino, The Impact of Immigratton on
the Amert~an Labor Market, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 245 (1974); Singhal, Labor Certification Under
Revzied Regulations, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 823 (1978). Permanent labor certification has not been
of particular significance in agricultural employment and is mentioned only incidentally in
this article, for the purpose of comparison.
11. Aliens may be admitted for the purpose of temporary employment under other non-
immigrant classifications, but only for positions requiring specialized education, skill, or
achievement, or positions related to international travel or diplomacy. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15)
(1976 & Supp. 1980). Nonimmigrants may sometimes work in the United States after being
admitted for another purpose, e.g., students, exchange visitors, and fiancees of U.S. citizens. 1
C. GORDON AND H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, at § 2.6b. However, the H-2 provisions pro-
vide the only nonimmigrant classification open to aliens seeking temporary admission primar-
ily for the purpose of performing unskilled labor. In this article the terms "laborers" and
"workers" refer to persons performing this type of work.
12. The Contract Labor Act of 1885, one of the first federal efforts at regulating immigra-
tion, made it unlawful to bring aliens to the United States for unskilled employment. Ch.
164, 23 Stat. 332 (1885). This provision was intended to "exclude aliens who would be in
competition with laborers already in the country." S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess.
359 (1950). In contrast to many of the early "qualitative" restrictions on immigration, the
contract labor provision "appears to have been enacted without ethnocentric overtones." D.
NORTH & A. LEBEL, MANPOWER AND IMMIGRATION POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES 25
(National Commission for Manpower Policy, Special Report No. 20, February, 1978).
The contract labor ban was strengthened in subsequent legislation, culminating in the Im-
migration Act of 1917. Pub. L. No. 301, 39 Stat. 874 (1917). Section 3 of the 1917 Act denied
admission to all "persons ... induced, assisted, encouraged, or solicited to migrate to this
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cultural employment. Farm employers, however, were permitted to re-
cruit foreign contract workers in large numbers during World Wars I
and II and throughout the post-war period.13  Farm labor was thus
treated wholly apart from overall immigration policy.
By 1950 two factors were creating pressure for revision of this two-
tiered approach to contract labor. First, there was widespread dissatis-
faction with the post-war Mexican labor program. After the World War
II program ended in 1947, foreign recruitment became a private matter
between the grower and the sending country. 14 This satisfied neither
the employers, who found it costly,' 5 nor the Mexican government,
which criticized the absence of employee safeguards. Further, labor rep-
resentatives believed that the peacetime use of foreign workers was dis-
placing U.S. migrants and depressing farm working conditions.' 6 After
a Presidential commission confirmed many of these complaints, 7 there
country by offers of employment. . . or in consequence of agreements. . . to perform labor."
39 Stat. at 876.
13. More than 80,000 agricultural workers from Mexico, Canada, and the Bahamas were
admitted during and immediately following World War I. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., Li-
BRARY OF CONGRESS, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAMS: BACK-
GROUND AND ISSUES 6-8 (Senate Judiciary Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as
TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAMS].
The contract labor ban was waived again from 1942 through 1947 in connection with
World War II. An average of 61,000 farmworkers were admitted annually (1943 through
1947) from Mexico, Jamaica, the Bahamas, Canada, Newfoundland, Barbados, and British
West Honduras. W. RASMUSSEN, A HISTORY OF THE EMERGENCY FARM LABOR SUPPLY
PROGRAM, 1943-1947, 199 (U.S. Dept. of Agriculture Monograph No. 13, Sept. 15, 1951).
Although aliens also worked in certain non-agricultural jobs during this period, most contract
workers were employed in farm labor. Set U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE ADMISSION OF ALIENS
FOR TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT, reprinted in HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess., STUDY OF POPULATION AND IMMIGRATION PROBLEMS 33, at 108-110 (Special Se-
ries No. 11, Comm. Print 1963) [hereinafter cited as 1963 DOL REPORT].
An average of 109,000 foreign workers from Mexico, Canada, the British West Indies, and
the Bahamas were admitted from 1948 through 1952, solely for agricultural employment.
TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAMS, supra at 36.
14. During World War 11 the federal government was intimately involved in the foreign
labor program, recruiting the workers in their native countries, transporting them to the
United States and guaranteeing performance of the work contract. TEMPORARY WORK
PROGRAMS, supra note 13, at 18-25. After 1947 aliens were recruited in countries other than
Mexico without any intergovernmental agreement. The use of Mexican workers continued to
be subject to an intergovernmental agreement, but the U.S. government was no longer di-
rectly involved in recruitment, transportation, or employment. Id at 28.
15. See, e.g. ,Admission of Foreign Agricultural Workers., Hearngs on S 272 Before a Subcomm. of
the Comm. on theJudiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 10-17 (1949) (statements of Keith Metz, George
Pickering, and B.A. Harrigan) [hereinafter cited as 1949 SenateJudiuiagr Hearings].
16. See, e.g., Farm Labor Program. Hearngs on S 949, S 984, and S 1106 Before the Senate
Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. 72-77, 123-135 (1951) (statements of
H.L. Mitchell and Walter J. Mason) [hereinafter cited as 1951 Senate Agriculture Hearngs].
17. President's Commission on Migratory Labor, Migratory Labor in American Agricul-
ture (1951). This Commission strongly condemned the post-war contract labor program:
We have failed to adopt policies designed to insure an adequate supply of. . .[migra-
tory] labor at decent standards of employment. Actually, we have done worse than that.
We have used the institutions of government to procure alien labor willing to work under
190
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was wide agreement that the United States could not continue to admit
farm workers in large numbers without greater government involve-
ment. However, there was no comparable agreement on whether such
peacetime admissions should continue.
Second, during the post-war period, Congress was pressing toward a
comprehensive simplification and revision of immigration law. Toward
this end, the Senate Judiciary Committee staff, under the direction of
Chairman Pat McCarran, in 1950 completed an exhaustive report on
the immigration system.18 Noting that the absolute ban on unskilled
contract labor was ineffective (because it was being routinely waived for
farm employers), the Judiciary Committee recommended that it be re-
placed with provisions permitting the use of foreign workers if domestic
workers would not be displaced.' 9 This recommendation was incorpo-
rated in the immigration bill submitted by Senator McCarran in 1950.
B. The Immigration And Naionality Act of 1952
Sections 101(a) (15) (H) (ii) and 214 of the McCarran-Walters Act ad-
dressed three issues raised by the uneven pattern of contract labor ad-
missions prior to 1952: statutory authority, admission standards, and
final agency responsibility.
The H-2 provisions established the first permanent statutory author-
ity for the admission of unskilled contract labor. Foreign workers could
previously be admitted only if the contract labor ban was temporarily
waived by special legislation or by administrative fiat.20 These waivers
had produced a patchwork of ad hoc programs lacking a central statu-
tory base. During the post-war period, farm employers argued for a per-
manent agricultural labor program outside the immigration
framework.2 ' The Judiciary Committee rejected such a separate pro-
obsolete and backward conditions and thus to perpetuate those very conditions. This not
only entrenches a bad system, it expands it. - .
Id at 23.
18. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) [hereinafter cited as 1950 JUDICIARY
COMMrirEE REPORT].
19. Id. at 362-363.
20. During World War I and from 1948 through 1952 unskilled contract workers were
admitted solely by administrative waiver. This process was subject to serious legal question,
for it rested on the ninth proviso to § 3 of the Immigration Act of 1917, a rulemaking provi-
sion making no specific reference to contract workers. See Pub. L. No. 301, § 3, 39 Stat. 874
(1917). In 1949 the State Department reported that " there may be some need for clarifica-
tion of the statutory authority under which foreign workers are admitted temporarily for
employment in the United States agricultural activities." Letter from Ernest Gross, Ass't
Secretary of State, to Hon. Pat McCarran (May 4, 1949), reprinted in 1949 Senate Jud'ciaov
Hearings, supra note 15, at 8-10.
21. See, e.g., 1949 Senate Judiciat Hearngs, supra note 15, at 10-17 (statements of Keith
Metz, George Pickering, and B.A. Harrigan.
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gram, but recommended that "provisions . . . be made in permanent
legislation which would permit the admission of temporary agricultural
labor."' 22 The 82nd Congress followed this middle course, authorizing
admission of contract workers for agriculture but only on the same terms
as for other industries. The H-2 provisions thus ended both the uncer-
tainty as to the authority to admit unskilled workers and the justifica-
tion for piecemeal creation of programs limited to agriculture.
Section 101(a) (15) (H) (ii) also set out standards to govern when tem-
porary laborers might be admitted.23 An existing statutory provision au-
thorized the admission of craftsmen and other skilled workmen "if labor
of like kind unemployed can not be found in this country. '24 The Judi-
ciary Committee recommended that a similar standard govern the ad-
mission of all temporary workers under the new immigration law.
Following this recommendation, the 82nd Congress provided that H-2
workers should be admitted only "if unemployed persons capable of per-
forming such service or labor cannot be found in this country. '25 This
language expressed a Congressional intent that foreign workers be ad-
mitted only "for thepurpose of alleviating labor shortages," subject to
"strong safeguards for American labor."' 26
However, Congress failed to assign clear responsibility for protecting
U.S. workers. During the post-war period, no temporary workers could
be admitted unless the Secretary of Labor "certified" that U.S. workers
were unavailable. 27 As submitted to the 82nd Congress, § 214(c) pro-
vided simply that "the question of the necessity of importing any alien
. . . under [§ 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)] . . . shall be determined by the Attor-
ney General. '28 Labor representatives attacked this provision on the
ground that only the Secretary of Labor had the expertise needed to
make the certification decisions.29 Senator McCarran then revised
22. 1950 JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 18, at 586.
23. Between 1948 and 1952 the Commissioner of Immigration had no statutory guidance
as to when the contract labor ban should be waived for unskilled workers. The Judiciary
Committee concluded that this "discretionary authority should be circumscribed by certain
definite limitations." 1950 JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT, srupra note 18, at 387.
24. Pub. L. No. 301, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 877 (1917).
25. 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(1976).
26. H.R. 1365,82nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 44,50,repnntedin [195212 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1653, at 1698 and 1705.
27. Letter from J. Donald Kingsley, Federal Security Agency, to Hon. Pat McCarran
(April 29, 1949), repnnied in 1949 Senate Judta y Hearings, supra note 15, at 7-8. In practice,
however, the certification decisions were heavily influenced by the Department of Agricul-
ture. "The United States Employment Service has delegated authority to certify to the indi-
vidual state organizations, and, at the present time, county agents make the required local
certification." 1950 JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 18, at 585.
28. S. 716, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., § 214(c) (1951) (§ 215 of S. 716 became § 214 in the
final bill).
29. See, e.g., Revision of Immigration, Naturalization and Nationality Laws: Joint Hearings on S.
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§ 214(c) to require that the Attorney General rule on H-2 petitions only
"after consultation with appropriate agencies of the Government. '30
But Congress stopped short of binding the Attorney General to the deci-
sion of any agency or even specifying the agencies to be consulted. The
Attorney General soon provided for "advisory" certification by the Sec-
retary of Labor.3 ' Yet the failure to expressly delegate this authority to
the Secretary by statute has encouraged employers to transform disputes
over the number of admissions into attacks on the Labor Department's
participation in the certification process. Most importantly, as detailed
in Section IV below, the failure of the 82nd Congress to provide for
mandatory DOL certification has hampered the administration of the
H-2 program by separating operating responsibility from final
authority.
The H-2 provisions were enacted as part of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act in June, 1952, almost exactly as originally introduced.
32
The 82nd Congress never debated these provisions in detail, 33 because
by mid-1951 Congress had enacted separate temporary legislation
(known as the "bracero program") 34 authorizing the admission of Mexi-
can agricultural workers to deal with labor shortages arising out of the
Korean War. Even while Congress was enacting the H-2 provisions, it
was understood that their practical significance would be determined
only after the termination of the bracero program.
716, H.R. 2379, and H.R. 2816 Before Subcomns. of the Comms. on theJudiciary, 82nd Cong., 1st
Sess. 122, 664-665 (1951) (statements of H.L. Mitchell and Walter Mason).
30. S. 2055, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., § 214(c). The phrase "consultation with appropriate
agencies" had been used in the Judiciary Committee's 1950 recommendations. 1950 JUDICI-
ARY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 18, at 586. That report did not identify the agencies
deemed appropriate for consultation, but recognized that the Department of Labor had long
played the primary role and that serious concerns had been raised as to "false certifications"
by Department of Agriculture extension agents. Id at 573-586.
31. See Part II infta.
32. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-144, §§ 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)
and 214, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (McCarran-Walters Act). The only substantive difference in the
H-2 provisions between Senator McCarran's original bill, S. 3455, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1950), and the statute as enacted was the amendment to § 214(c) discussed supra in text at
note 30.
33. The H-2 provisions were discussed only briefly in the 1952 Committee Reports, H.R.
1365, supra note 26, at 44-45 and 50; S. REP. No. 1137, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 20-21 (1952),
and were never mentioned in the extensive floor debates.
34. Act of July 12, 1951, Pub. L. No. 81-78, 65 Stat. 119. The term "bracero " was used in
Mexico to refer to unskilled and semi-skilled workers who performed arduous manual labor.
MEXICAN WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES 30, at n.7 (G. and M. Kiser, eds. 1979). Al-
though the phrase "bracero program" is sometimes used to refer to all uses of Mexican con-
tract labor in the United States between 1942 through 1964, in this article "bracero program"
refers only to the program established in 1951.
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C. The H-2 Program During the Bracero Period" 1952-1964
Although originally scheduled to expire at the end of 1953, the
bracero program was extended for eleven years. This led to a massive
influx of Mexican farm laborers, far exceeding the number admitted
during World War I, World War II, the post-war period or the Korean
War. At the height of the bracero program, from 1956 through 1959,
over 432,000 Mexican nationals were admitted annually for agricultural
employment.
35
The bracero program vastly overshadowed the H-2 provisions be-
tween 1952 and 1964. A small number of agricultural employers used
the H-2 program during this period to import contract workers from the
British West Indies, the Bahamas and Canada, 36 solely on the basis of
private contractual agreements.3 7 Between 7,000 and 14,000 West In-
dian and Bahamian workers were employed each year along the East
Coast and in the Midwest, harvesting sugarcane, shade tobacco, apples,
citrus fruit, strawberries, and a variety of vegetables. 38 Approximately
7,000 Canadians were admitted each year, primarily for work in pota-
toes and apples in New England.39 Annual H-2 admissions for farm
35. For the number of Mexican braceros admitted each year and their distribution by
state and crop, see 1963 DOL REPORT, supra note 13 at 36, Tables 1-12; TEMPORARY
WORKER PROGRAMS, supra note 13 at 36, Table 2. The United States government was di-
rectly involved in this program, recruiting workers in Mexico, transporting them to the bor-
der, and guaranteeing their employment contracts. See, e.g., Spradlin, The Mexi an Farm Labor
Importation Program-Review and Reform (pt. 1), 30 GEO. WASH. L.R. 84, 87-95 (1961).
36. U.S. employers began recruiting British West Indian, Bahamian, and Canadian con-
tract workers during World War II. RASMUSSAN, supra note 13 at 199. Only agricultural
employers continued this recruitment during the post-war period. 1963 DOL REPORT, supra
note 13 at 110- 113.
A small number of Japanese and Filipinos were also admitted under the H-2 program for
farmwork in California. SENATE SUBCOMM. ON IMMIGRATION, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
THE WEST INDIES (BWI) TEMPORARY ALIEN LABOR PROGRAM: 1943-1977, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 27, Table 2 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter cited as WEST INDIES LABOR PROGRAM];
1963 DOL REPORT, supra note 13, at 147.
37. As originally proposed, the bracero program would have applied to all employers
importing farmworkers from the Western Hemisphere. S. 984, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., § 501,
reprinted in 1951 Senate Agriculture Hearings, supra note 16 at 3-5. However, growers using non-
Mexican contract workers successfully fought to be excluded from the bracero program. 1951
Senate Agriculture Hearings,supra note 16, at 15, 16-18 (statements of C.J. Bourn, Senator Spes-
sard Holland, and Senator George Aiken). The growers sought to avoid the increased DOL
supervision involved in the bracero program: "[W]e would like to continue this arrangement
without disturbance from the Labor Department, which definitely is not a friendly govern-
mental agency .. " Id at 15 (statement of C.J. Bourn).
38. WEST INDIES LABOR PROGRAM, supra note 36, at 16; 1963 DOL REPORT, supra note
13, at 110-115. In 1962 West Indian and Bahamian farm workers were employed in fourteen
states: Florida, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Virginia, West Virginia, New Jersey, New York,
Indiana, Texas, Michigan, Wisconsin, Maryland, Minnesota, and New Hampshire. 1963
DOL REPORT, supra note 13, at 113.
39. TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAMS, supra note 13, at 36; D. NORTH, NONIMMIGRANT
WORKERS IN THE U.S.: CURRENT TRENDS AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 36 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as NONIMMIGRANT WORKERS].
Vol. 1:187, 1983
Aliens in the Orchard
labor never exceeded thirteen percent of the contemporaneous admis-
sions under the bracero program.4
D. 1965" The Struggle To Shape the H-2 Program
The bracero program was criticized for displacing U.S. farmworkers,
depressing agricultural working conditions, and permitting the abuse of
the Mexican workers. 4' These concerns gradually came to outweigh the
support of agricultural interests and the bracero program was allowed to
expire at the end of 1964.
When it became clear that the bracero program would be terminated,
farm employers mounted a campaign to obtain Mexican workers under
the H-2 program. Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz moved in the oppo-
site direction, seeking to end even the existing uses of H-2 workers.
42
These conflicting views led to a major confrontation in the Senate.
Throughout the first six months of 1965 agricultural spokesmen at-
tacked the "unfortunate and illogical position ' 43 of the Secretary of La-
bor, urging that H-2's be admitted to avoid agricultural "crises".
Although these efforts were occasionally successful, by the end of the
summer it was apparent that contract workers would be unavailable on
a large scale as long as the Labor Department controlled the certifica-
tion decision. Consequently, agricultural interests tried to empower the
Secretary of Agriculture to ultimately determine the need for or availa-
40. From 1954 through 1959 H-2 admissions for agriculture averaged less than four per-
cent of contemporaneous admissions under the bracero program. The ratio of H-2 to Mexi-
can workers rose to over twelve percent in 1964. See TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAMS, supra
note 13, at 36.
41. See, e.g., Extension of Mexican Farm Labor Program: Hearings on S. 1446, S 1945, and HR.
2010 Before the Subcom. on Agricultural Research and General Legislation of the Senate Agriculture and
Forestry Comm., 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 103, 151, 258, and 159 (1961) (statements of Douglas
Still, Rev. James Vizzard, Arnold Mayer, and Arthur Goldberg); Mexican Farm Labor Program:
Hearings on HR. 1863 and HR. 2009 Before the Subcomm. on Equipment, Supplies, and Manpower of
the House Agriculture Comm, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 143 and 192 (1963) (statements of Helen
Gahagan Douglas and Andrew Biemiller); U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, MEXICAN FARM LABOR
PROGRAM: CONSULTANTS' REPORT 3-7 (October, 1959), reprinted in Extension of the Mexican
Farm Labor Program: Hearings on S 1446, S 1945, and HR. 2010, supra at 267, 270-274.
For other contemporary discussions of the bracero program, see E. GALARZA, MERCHANTS
OF LABOR (1964); Hadley, A Critiial Anaosis of the Wetback Problem, 21 LAW AND CGNTEMP.
PROB. 334 (1956); Spradlin, The Mexican Farm Labor Importation Program-Review and Reform,
supra note 35, at 84.
42. In late 1964 the Department of Labor published restrictive new H-2 regulations. 29
Fed. Reg. 19,101 (1964). In an accompanying statement Secretary Wirtz predicted that the
use of foreign workers "will be very greatly reduced, and hopefully eliminated." Statement
by Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz on the Termination of Public Law 78 (December 19,
1964), reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, YEAR OF TRANSrrION: SEASONAL FARM LABOR
1965, APPENDIX H at 4 (1965).
43. 111 CONG. REc. 3,629 (1965) (remarks of Senator Holland). See also Ill CONG. REC.
3,099, 4,472, 10,374, and 15,419 (1965) (additional remarks of Senator Holland).
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bility of agricultural labor.44
The Senate debate on this provision remains the most complete Con-
gressional consideration of the role of the H-2 provisions in agriculture.
Agricultural spokesmen, led by Senator Spessard Holland of Florida,
argued that the Secretary of Labor had "consistently misconstrued Con-
gressional intent" in attempting to minimize or eliminate the use of for-
eign labor.45 Opponents argued that the agricultural interests were
trying to undo the decision to terminate the bracero program.46 In Sep-
tember, 1965, on the tie-breaking vote of Vice-President Hubert
Humphrey, the Senate decided to delete the provision transferring certi-
fication authority.47 This was a clear, although exceedingly narrow,
Congressional decision that the H-2 program should not be used to con-
tinue the bracero program or otherwise routinely admit large numbers
of contract workers.
48
Bolstered by this victory, the Secretary of Labor quickly phased out
the use of Mexican workers.49 Most existing uses of H-2 workers were
also terminated. 50 However, Northeast apple orchardists and the Flor-
ida sugarcane producers continued to receive H-2 certifications. To
block the admission of Mexican braceros under the H-2 program, Secre-
tary Wirtz was compelled to continue the H-2 program for the two larg-
44. "[D]eterminations... of the amount of labor needed for the production and harvest-
ing of any agricultural crop, or of the availability thereof. . . shall be made by the Secretary
of Agriculture and shall be accepted by all agenices of the United States." H.R. 9811, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 703 (1953), repnnted in Ill CONG. REc. 23,504 (1965).
45. 111 CONG. REC. 23,512 (1965) (remarks of Senator Holland).
46. See, e.g., id at 23,515 (remarks of Senator Williams) and 23,527-23,528 (remarks of
Senator Bass).
47. Id at 23,530.
48. Although the Senate was the focal point of the struggle over the H-2 program in 1965,
labor representatives made two efforts in the House to add restrictive amendments, both of
which were unsuccessful. First, the AFL-CIO urged that § 214(c) be amended to bar the
admission of H-2 workers for farm jobs. Immigration. Hearings on HR. 2580 Before Subcomm. No.
/ of the HouseJudiciaq Comm., 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 323 (1965) (statement of Andrew Biemul-
ler). The Judiciary Committee did not adopt this amendment, but expressed concern that
the H-2 provisions "not be abused." H.R. REP. No. 745, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 15 (1965).
Second, Rep. Gilbert of New York introduced an amendment which would have made all H-
2 admissions "subject to the approval of the Secretary of Labor." This amendment was also
rejected. 111 CONG. REC. 21,805-6 (1965).
49. Mexican admissions were reduced from 1965 through 1967 and terminated com-
pletely at the end of 1967. WEST INDIES LABOR PROGRAM, supra note 36, at 27, Table 2.
50. The admission of West Indians in the Midwest and of Japanese in California ended in
1964. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, YEAR OF TRANsITON: SEASONAL FARM LABOR 1965, Appen-
dix A (1965); WEST INDIES LABOR PROGRAM, supra note 36, at 27. The routine use of H-2's
in the Florida vegetable, strawberry and citrus crops ended in 1965 (West Indians were ad-
mitted to pick citrus in Florida on several occasions in the late 1960's in response to short-
term emergencies). NONIMMIGRANT WORKERS, supra note 39, at 43. No H-2's were admit-
ted for New England shade tobacco after 1966. Id at 44. The use of Canadian H-2's to
harvest potatoes was phased out gradually, ending in 1976. Id at 43.
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est and most influential groups of H-2 employers.51
The termination of the bracero program thus produced a strange pat-
tern in the use of contract workers in the United States, due far more to
the delicate political balance in the Senate in 1965 than to the language
of the statute. The opponents of contract labor won a major victory in
terminating the larger and more important program and barring all
Mexican contract workers. Had the contract workers employed in ap-
ples and sugarcane been admitted under the bracero program, they too
would have been barred. But because these workers were being admit-
ted under the H-2 provisions, a separate effort would have been required
to end these admissions. In 1965 this was not politically feasible.
The struggle to terminate the bracero program led to significant
changes in the size and scope of the H-2 program, reducing admissions
by forty percent over four years52 and closing this program in all but
two crops. Yet the most important change was a reversal of the role of
the H-2 program in U.S. immigration policy. During the bracero period
the H-2 program was but a footnote to a national policy encouraging
the use of contract labor in agriculture. Since 1965 the H-2 program has
been the sole exception to a national policy prohibiting the use of con-
tract workers.
II. The Administrative Structure
The Immigration and Naturalization Service53 requires an employer
seeking H-2 workers to first request the Secretary of Labor to certify that
51. The importance of the Secretary of Labor's "flexibility" toward traditional H-2 users
is illustrated by the following comments of Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine, whose support
was essential to Secretary Wirtz's effort. Immediately prior to the Senate vote Senator Mus-
kie stated:
Mr. President, my State has a direct interest in the farm labor question. Traditionally,
Canadian workers have been recruited to help with the harvesting of potatoes and
apples.
I am in agreement with the Secretary's objectives ...
At the same time, I have had questions about the Secretary of Labor's approach to the
problem, this year. In the begining of his efforts to curtail the importation of foreign
laborers, there was a tendency to be arbitrary in calling for drastic reductions in the use
of foreign labor. There was the clear implication that he planned to eliminate this source
in one year. ...
On the basis of our experience in Maine, however, it is clear that the Secretary of
Labor has adopted a more realistic attitude toward the farm labor problem. When we
were able to demonstrate that there were not sufficient domestic laborers available the
Secretary authorized importation of Canadian workers.
111 CONG. REc. 23,529 (1965).
52. Total H-2 admissions fell from 22,286 in 1964 to 13,323 in 1968. WEST INDIES LABOR
PROGRAM, supra note 36, at 27, Table 2.
53. The Attorney General has delegated to the Commissioner of the INS the authority to
rule on H-2 visa petitions. 8 C.F.R. §§ 2.1 and 100.2 (1982).
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(i) "qualified persons in the United States are not available" and that
(ii) "the employment of foreign workers will not adversely affect the
wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly
employed. '54 The INS regulations assign the certification function to
DOL and establish the criteria,55 but do not indicate how DOL's deter-
minations should be made. DOL makes these determinations by requir-
ing employers to "test the market" through the national network of
public employment offices.
A. Employment Servzce System
Under the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933,56 the U.S. Department of La-
bor funds and regulates approximately 2,000 state-operated "employ-
ment service" offices. These offices match employers and potential
employees through the use of a "job order," an employment offer filed
by the employer and displayed to potential employees. 57 Employers
wishing to recruit outside their state can file an interstate job order,
which is routed through DOL's interstate "clearance" system to employ-
ment service offices in other sections of the country.58 Detailed regula-
tions govern the use of the interstate clearance system to recruit
farmworkers.
59
54. Either a certification from the Secretary of Labor. . .stating that qualified persons
in the United States are not available and that the employment of the beneficiary will
not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States
similarly employed, or a notice that such a certification cannot be made, shall be at-
tached to every nonimmigrant visa petition to accord an alien a classification under
section 101(a)(15)(H)(ii) of the Act.
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(3)(i) (1982).
55. The "availability" criterion is drawn directly from the statute. The "adverse effect"
language rests on a long-standing DOL requirement and on language in related statutes.
During the post-war period DOL guidelines provided that unskilled contract workers could
be admitted only if this would not "detrimentally affect" U.S. workers. PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION ON MIGRATORY LABOR, MIGRATORY LABOR IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 36
(1951). In 1951 Congress incorporated this concept in the bracero program. Act of July 12,
1951, Pub. L. No. 82-78, § 503, 65 Stat. 119 ("will not adversely affect the wages and working
conditions of domestic agricultural workers similarly employed"). Soon thereafter the "ad-
verse effect" language was set out in DOL regulations, 16 Fed. Reg. 9,142 (1951), and en-
forced as to both the bracero and H-2 programs. Dellon, Foreign Agncultural Workers and the
Prevention of Adverse Efect, 1966 LABOR L.J. 739. See also § 212(a)(14) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, regulating permanent admission for employment. Pub. L. No. 82-
414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952). From 1952 to 1966 INS regulations incorporated the adverse effect
criterion by requiring compliance with DOL policies. In 1966 this standard was expressly set
out in the INS regulations. 31 Fed. Reg. 11,744 (1966).
56. 29 U.S.C. §§ 49-49k (1976).
57. 20 C.F.R. § 653.5 (1982).
58. 20 C.F.R. § 651.10 (1982) (definition of "clearance").
59. 20 C.F.R. Part 653, Subpart F (1982). Eg., all job orders must accurately describe
the material elements of the job, assure compliance with all applicable employment related
laws and offer at least the wages and working conditions prevailing among similarly em-
ployed agricultural workers in the area of intended employment. Id at § 653.501(d) and (e)
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B. Certification Regulations
The employment service offices form the foundation of DOL's tempo-
rary labor certification structure. Agricultural employers seeking H-2
workers must first attempt to recruit U.S. workers through the interstate
clearance system, offering the minimum terms and assurances set out in
separate H-2 certification regulations. 6° These regulations provide, inter
ah'a, that growers seeking certification must offer to pay at least the "ad-
verse effect [wage] rate" and to provide housing, occupational insurance,
tools, and low-cost meals. 6' All benefits offered in the job order must be
paid to any worker actually hired, domestic or foreign. An agricultural
employer seeking H-2 workers must file a job order and an application
for certification at least sixty days before the date on which the workers
are needed. 62 These papers are sent to the appropriate DOL regional
office and reviewed for the required terms and assurances. If these crite-
ria are met and the application is timely, the job order is forwarded to
the states believed by DOL to be "potential sources of U.S. workers. '63
The order (or a summary thereof) is then transferred to the local offices
and made available to inquiring workers.
Sixty days after the application is filed or twenty days before the date
the foreign workers are needed, whichever is later, DOL determines
whether the employer has made the required recruitment efforts and
hired all available U.S. workers.64 If the employer has satisfied these
requirements but a sufficient number of workers has not been located,
certification will be granted for the aliens needed to fill the remaining
positions.
(1982). Much of the litigation arising out of the use of the interstate clearance system has
dealt with these protective requirements. See, e.g., Gomez v. Florida State Employment Serv-
ice, 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969); Jenkins v. S. & A. Chaissan and Sons, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 216
(S.D.N.Y. 178); Abraham v. Beatrice Foods Co., 418 F. Supp. 1384 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Vaz-
quez v. Ferre, 404 F. Supp. 815 (D.NJ. 1975); Galindo v. Del Monte Corporation, 382 F.
Supp. 464 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
60. 20 C.F.R. Part 655, Subpart C (1982).
61. 20 C.F.R. § 655.202(b)(1), (2), (3), (4), and (9) (1982). The "adverse effect [wage]
rate" (AEWR) is a special minimum hourly wage designed to prevent an adverse effect on the
wages of U.S. workers. Id at § 655.200(b). See infa Section III(B).
62. 20 C.F.R. § 655.201(c) (1982). The regulations recommend that these papers be filed
at least eighty days before the date of need, to allow the employer twenty days after the
certification decision to bring the foreign workers to this country. Id
63. Id at § 655.205(a).
64. Id at § 655.205(c) and .206(a). A worker is considered available if he has made a
"firm commitment to work for the employer." This commitment may be made through a
crewleader or other representative and need not be evidenced by a signed contract. Id at
§ 6 55.2 0 6 (a).
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C. Final Decisions by INS
Certification by DOL is the principal step in obtaining H-2 workers,
but not the final one. An employer seeking temporary contract workers
must also petition the district office of the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service to approve the issuance of H-2 visas.65 This petition must
be accompanied by a copy of DOL's ruling on the application for certifi-
cation and a statement describing why it is necessary to use alien work-
ers.66 If DOL has denied certification, the employer may nevertheless
seek INS approval by presenting "countervailing evidence" showing
that "qualified persons in the United States are not available" and that
"the employment policies of the Department of Labor have been
observed. "
67
If INS approves the visa petition, notice of this decision is sent to the
U.S. consulate in the country where the contract workers have been re-
cruited. If the aliens selected by the employer have the necessary exit
papers and are not barred under other immigration provisions, 6 H-2
visas are issued by the consul. Each worker must then display his H-2
visa at the border entry station.
69
III. The Scope of the Current H-2 Program
A. Northeast Apple Harvest
Approximately 300 apple producers70 in ten states71 regularly use H-2
workers. Most of these growers are members of a cooperative or associa-
tion which assists in the completion of the job orders, negotiates with
employment service officials, and takes part in the distribution of the H-
2 workers. 72 The job orders are filed in the Spring, often as late as mid-
65. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1) (1982).
66. Id at § 214.2(h)(3)(i) and (iii).
67. Id at § 214.2(h)(3)(i).
68. Like most immigrant and nonimmigrant aliens, temporary workers are subject to the
"qualitative exclusions" at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 1 C. GORDON AND H.
ROSENFIELD, .upra note 7, at § 2.32.
69. An approved H-2 visa petition is valid for the period covered by the DOL certifica-
tion or one year, whichever is less. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(7) (1982). An H-2 visa may be ex-
tended, but only if the extension would not result in an unbroken stay in the U.S. of more
than three years. Id at § 214.2(h)(11).
70. In 1982, 317 Northeast apple producers sought H-2 certification. U.S. EMPLOYMENT
SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, DATA SHEET ON CERTIFICATION AND ADMISSION OF FOREIGN
APPLE PICKERS (December 10, 1982) (unpublished document obtained from the Office of
Technical Support, U.S. Employment Serv., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Washington, D.C.).
71. H-2 workers are used annually to harvest apples in Maine, New Hampshire, Ver-
mont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Maryland, West Virginia, and
Virginia. id
72. The association is sometimes the primary employer, filing the job order in its own
name, housing the workers and assigning the workers on a daily basis to association members.
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June, and sent to the states along the Eastern seaboard (and sometimes
to Puerto Rico and Texas). In August DOL certifies that there is a need
for foreign workers to fill the positions not filled by domestic workers.
During the last six seasons, DOL has certified from 4,835 to 6,552 for-
eign workers for the Northeast apple harvest.
73
These positions are filled by contract workers from Jamaica. Each
Spring, the grower associations meet with the Caribbean Regional La-
bour Board,74 represented in the United States by the British West In-
dies Central Labour Organisation, 75  to negotiate the terms of
employment for the coming season. The terms agreed upon in these
negotiations are set out in a "standard contract" which will govern the
recruitment, transportation, housing, and employment of the foreign
workers. Over eighty percent of the Jamaicans hired for the apple har-
vest are individually "pre-designated" by the apple producers on the
basis of satisfactory prior performance. 76 The remaining workers are se-
lected through a four-stage screening process. The Jamaican legisla-
ture77 and the governments of Barbados, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and
Dominica nominate approximately 15,000 individuals for consideration
Eg., Tri-County Growers, Inc., Martinsburg, W.Va., which is controlled by local apple pro-
ducers, seeks certification in its own name for over 500 foreign workers. These workers are
housed in a single labor camp and assigned to work for apple producers within a twenty-mile
radius. Tri-County Growers, Inc., Clearance Order No. 0417828, at 1 (1981).
73. U.S. EMPLOYMENT SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, LABOR CERTIFICATIONS GRANTED
FOR TEMPORARY FOREIGN WORKERS (H-2's) IN AGRICULTURAL AND LOGGING OCCUPA-
TIONS, TABLE III (January 31, 1983) (unpublished document obtained from the Office of
Technical Support, U.S. Employment Serv., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Washington, D.C.) [herein-
after cited as LABOR CERTIFICATIONS GRANTED]. In the 1982 apple season the 6,383 certifi-
cations were distributed as follows: Maine (480), New Hampshire (320), Vermont (329),
Massachusetts (462), Rhode Island (18), Connecticut (145), New York (2,662), Maryland
(370), West Virginia (555) and Virginia (1,042). Id
The number of H-2 workers certified does not indicate the exact number admitted. Certifi-
cations are often slightly higher than admissions because employers decide not to use all the
workers certified or, in the case of figures covering more than one crop, a particular contract
worker remains in the country to work in more than one crop during the year. Occasionally
the number of certifications is lower than admissions, because more than one H-2 works in the
same job (the original worker is sent home and replaced by another) or H-2's are admitted
despite DOL's denial of certification. Certification figures are used throughout this article
because they indicate the number of positions DOL has been willing to allocate to foreign
workers and are the best figures available for comparing the use of H-2's over time and
among various states and crops.
74. The Caribbean Regional Labour Board is an intergovernmental body representing
the West Indian governments. There are six seats on this board, four held by Jamaica and
two held by the other Caribbean islands. BRITISH WEST INDIES CENTRAL-LABOUR ORGANI-
SATION, THE WEST INDIES PROGRAMME FOR TEMPORARY FARM LABOUR 2-3 (undated
booklet obtained from the British West Indies Central Labour Organisation, Washington,
D.C., in 1981).
75. The British West Indies Central Labour Organisation (BWICLO) is an unincorpo-
rated organization with headquarters in Washington, D.C. and permanent field offices in
Florida. BRITISH WEST INDIES CENTRAL LABOUR ORGANISATION, TEMPORARY AGRICUL-
TURAL LABOUR IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1981).
76. Rios v. Marshall, 530 F. Supp. 351, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
77. The initial hurdle facing Jamaican workers interested in working as H-2's in the
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by the apple and sugarcane producers. Representatives of the Florida
sugar companies then travel to the islands to screen these men, designat-
ing approximtely 8,000 they would be willing to employ.78 By agree-
ment with the apple producers, the Jamaican Ministry of Labor then
selects from this group the approximately 1,000 Jamaicans needed to
complete the apple harvest workforce. 79 Finally, all selected workers are
given medical examinations and screened by the Jamaican Ministry of
Labor in terms of police and employment records.
In late August or early September, after INS has approved the visa
petitions, the H-2's are brought by chartered planes to Florida and
transported by bus to orchards throughout the Northeast. During the
harvest, which runs for six to eight weeks, the Jamaicans live in labor
camps near the orchards and work six days a week, eight to ten hours
per day. Payment is on a piece-rate basis.8 0 At season's end the H-2's
are bused back to Florida and returned to Jamaica by plane.8 '
The Jamaicans are intensely concentrated in certain markets. H-2's
constitute 66% of the apple harvest workforce in the Hudson Valley,8
2
64% in western Maryland,8 3 36% in the Romney-Martinsburg area of
West Virginia,84 and 54% in the Winchester area of Virginia. 85
United States is political, t. , a worker cannot be considered unless he has been "nominated"
by a member of the Jamaican Parliament on the recommendation of a local committee ap-
pointed for this purpose. This process was described as follows by Norman Manley, former
Prime Minister of Jamaica:
In general, the committees pick these men with no regard to their fitness for the specific
type of work involved. The whole thing is purely a political exercise .... [T]he com-
mittees select in such a manner as to favor local, grassroots political supporters of the
party in power in the constituency. Thus, for instance, if an important man in a particu-
lar village asks the committee to let his son go to the U.S. on the program, the committee
would submit the young man's name.
P. KRAMER, THE OFFSHORES 33 (1966). See also BRITISH WEST INDIES CENTRAL LABOUR
ORGANISATION, THE WEST INDIES PROGRAMME FOR TEMPORARY FARM LABOUR, supra
note 74, at 4; NONIMMIGRANT WORKERS IN THE U.S., supra note 39, at 35.
78. Rios v. Marshall, 530 F. Supp. 351, 365-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See T. McCoy AND C.
WOOD, CARIBBEAN WORKERS IN THE FLORIDA SUGARCANE INDUSTRY 11 (Center for Latin
American Studies, U. of Florida, Paper No. 2, 1982) (in Jamaica growers select 7,000 workers
from a pool of 10,000) [hereinafter cited as CARIBBEAN WORKERS].
79. Rios v. Marshall, 530 F. Supp. 351, 365-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
80. For a discussion of piece rates in the apple harvest, see infa text following note 130.
81. A number of Jamaican apple workers remain in Florida during the winter for the
sugarcane harvest. NONIMMIGRANT WORKERS IN THE U.S., supra note 39, at 37.
82. JOB SERVICE Div., NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF LABOR, 1981 DOMESTIC AGRICUL-
TURAL IN-SEASON WAGE REPORT: HUDSON VALLEY APPLE HARVEST (FRESH MARKET) 1
(1982) [hereinafter cited as 1981 HUDSON VALLEY WAGE REPORT].
83. RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS DIV., MARYLAND DEP'T OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,
1981 DOMESTIC AGRICULTURAL IN-SEASON WAGE REPORT: WESTERN AREA (APPLE HAR-
VEST) 1 (1981).
84. WEST VIRGINIA DEP'T OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 1981 DOMESTIC AGRICULTURAL
IN-SEASON WAGE REPORT: ROMNEY-MARTINSBURG (APPLE PICKING) 1 (1981).
85. RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS Div., VIRGINIA EMPLOYMENT COMM'N, 1981 DOMESTIC
AGRICULTURAL IN-SEASON WAGE REPORT: WINCHESTER 1 (1982).
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B. Florida Sugarcane
The Florida sugarcane harvest runs for six months, from October to
April. Seven to ten sugarcane producers and producer cooperatives in
the Lake Okeechobee area of southern Florida, acting individually or
through the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association,8 6 request certifica-
tion each year for approximately 8,500 cane cutters and 350 supervisors
and cooks. Because few, if any, U.S. workers are hired during the re-
cruitment period, in September DOL certifies almost exactly the
number of foreign workers requested. For each of the last five seasons,
DOL certified between 8,530 and 9,140 job openings in the sugarcane
harvest.
8 7
Eighty percent of the H-2's obtained to fill these positions are re-
cruited in Jamaica, with the others drawn from Barbados, St. Lucia, St.
Vincent, and Dominica.8 8 The sugarcane producers pre-designate sixty
percent of the workforce by name, based on their prior work in Florida
sugarcane. The remaining workers are selected through the screening
process discussed above: After the workers nominated by the West In-
dian governments have been "screened down" by the sugarcane produ-
cers, the governments select approximately 3,500 workers to complete
the sugarcane workforce.89
The cane cutters live in large labor camps in or near the fields, often
with limited access to the outside worldY0 Using a heavy machete, the
workers cut the twelve-foot sugarcane stalks near ground level, chop
them into sections and stack the pieces. Despite the tropical weather,
the cutters must wear gloves, heavy clothing and metal foot and shin
guards for protection against the machetes and sharp stalks.9 1 Wages
are paid on a piece rate basis, each worker being expected to cut eight
86. The Florida Fruit and Vegetable Ass'n (FFVA) acts as the agent for its sugarcane
producing members, submitting the certification application in its own name. In 1981 FFVA
sought certification for 6,097 cane cutters, to be distributed among seven sugarcane producers
and producer cooperatives. See Letter from Ralph Alewine, DOL Certifying Officer, Region
IV, to George F. Sorn, at 1 (July 17, 1981).
87. LABOR CERTIFICATIONS GRANTED, supra note 73, at Table III.
88. BRITISH WEST INDIES CENTRAL LABOUR ORGANISATION, DISTRIBUTION BY STATES
(1981) (unpublished document made available by the British West Indies Central Labour
Organisation, Washington, D.C.).
89. Rios v. Marshall, 530 F. Supp. 351, 365-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
90. See, e.g., Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1973).
91. NORTH AMERICAN CONGRESS ON LATIN AMERICA, CARIBBEAN MIGRATION, XI
NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS, 12 (Nov.-Dec. 1977) [hereinafter cited as CARIBBEAN
MIGRATION].
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tons of cane per day.92 The producers vary the piece rates from day to
day, based on the employer's estimate of the difficulty of the cutting.
9 3
Workers who do not earn the minimum hourly guarantee94 through
their piece rate work are repatriated.
95
Three employers-U.S. Sugar Corporation, Gulf and Western Food
Products Company, and the Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative-use
two-thirds of the H-2 workers admitted for the sugarcane harvest.
9 6
None of the Florida sugarcane producers employ a significant number
of U.S. cane cutters.
C. New Crops, Areas, and Workers
From 1968 through 1976 the regular use of the H-2 program was lim-
ited, with one exception,9 7 to the use of West Indians along the East
Coast. However, during the last six years contract workers, including
Mexican braceros, have been certified for work in several new crops and
areas of the country.9 8 Growers in the Presidio Valley of Texas used 800
Mexican H-2's in 1977 and 400 in 1978.99 The next year, use of the
program spread to four other states. In Colorado, Mexican contract
92. See, e.g., U.S. Sugar Corp. Clearance Order No. 2723406, Attachment, at 2 (June 26,
1981); CARIBBEAN WORKERS, supra note 78, at 14.
93. Before beginning work each day a cutter is told what he will be paid for completing
his assigned "task," which usually consists of cutting a quarter-mile row. The price varies
according to the supervisor's estimate of the density and weight of the cane, the effectiveness
of the burning, whether the stalks have fallen on their sides, and other factors. P. KRAMER,
THE OFFSHORES 45-47 (1966).
94. The "adverse effect wage rate" in effect at the outset of the 1982-83 sugarcane harvest
was $4.69 per hour. 47 Fed. Reg. 37,980 (1982). In January, 1983, this was increased to
$4.73. 48 Fed. Reg. 232, 233 (1983). See infta text at note 125.
95. See, e.g., FLORIDA FRUIT AND VEGETABLE ASS'N, FFVA SUGAR CANE DOMESTIC
PROGRAM AND H-2 PROGRAM, Part II, at 7 (1981) (FFVA instructions booklet for H-2 users)
[hereinafter cited as FFVA SUGAR CANE PROGRAM].
96. CARIBBEAN MIGRATION, supra note 91, at 13.
97. Canadian H-2 workers were admitted in small numbers for work in the Maine potato
harvest through 1976. NONIMMIGRANT WORKERS, supra note 39, at 43.
98. The certification figures used throughout the following discussion are drawn from
LABOR CERTIFICATION GRANTED, supra note 73, at Table III.
99. In 1977 farmers in the Presidio Valley sought visas for 809 Mexican nationals to har-
vest onions, melons, peppers, and cotton. Because these growers refused to recruit at the
required wage rate or provide housing, DOL could not certify that no U.S. workers were
available. Nevertheless, INS admitted all the requested aliens. 809 Agricultural Workers,
Beneficiaries of Two Visa Petitions Filed by Presidio Valley Farmers Ass'n, File Nos. ELP-N-
1387 and ELP-N-1388 (June 9, 1977). The 1977 Presidio Valley decision is discussed in7fra at
note 167.
When the Presidio Valley growers sought contract workers in 1978, again refusing to com-
ply with the H-2 regulations, both DOL and INS ruled that there had been no showing that
foreign workers were needed. The growers nevertheless obtained H-2 visas for over 400 Mexi-
can workers by court order. Presidio Valley Farmers' Ass'n v. Marshall, No. EP-78-CA-95
(W.D. Tex. May 26, 1978) (order granting preliminary injunction), appeal dismissed as moot,
617 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1980).
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workers were admitted to pick apples. 1° ° Maryland growers have em-
ployed H-2's from Jamaica to harvest peaches each year since 1979.101
Similarly, tobacco producers in southern Virginia have been using H-2's
since that year. Over 1,000 Mexican contract workers are certified every
Spring for six months of work in the tobacco harvest, where they make
up thirty percent of the seasonal workforce.10 2 Arizona citrus producers
also began using H-2's in 1979. After a union organizing campaign led
to the first collective bargaining agreement in the Arizona orchards, sev-
eral producers sought contract workers from Mexico (and, in one case,
Costa Rica). Although the farmworkers' union argued that the H-2 pro-
gram was being used as a weapon in a labor dispute,10 3 DOL certified
385 H-2's. Mexican contract workers are now admitted each October
for the nine-month citrus harvest.
In 1980 Maryland nursery operators imported Mexican H-2's for tree
pruning. In 1981 and 1982 Mexican H-2's were used to harvest vegeta-
bles in Colorado. An Arkansas corporation sought over 500 Jamaicans
in 1982 to plant pine seedlings in commercial forests in Virginia, South
Carolina, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, Texas, Arkansas and
Oklahoma. DOL certified H-2's for this work in Florida and Alabama
with little or no interstate recruitment.o4
The growth of the H-2 program is continuing. In late 1982 the two
largest lettuce producers in Florida sought 550 Mexican contract labor-
ers for the 1982-83 winter season, admittedly seeking to replace undocu-
mented aliens who had recently been deported. After nine days of
domestic recruitment, solely in Florida, DOL certified a need for 202
foreign workers. 0 5 This was the first use of H-2's in Florida outside of
100. Seegenerally West. Colo. Fruit Growers v. Marshall, 473 F. Supp. 693 (D. Colo. 1979)
(decision upholding denial of certification for 1978 apple harvest); Jones v. Edwards, No. 79-
A-337 (D. Colo. April 24, 1979) (preliminary injunction reversing denial of certification for
the 1979 peach harvest; no H-2's actually admitted); 1-70 Fruit v. Edwards, No. 79-A-910 (D.
Colo. July 16, 1979) (134 Mexican H-2's certified after suit filed but before judicial decision).
101. Seegmnera/Oj Washington County Fruit Growers Ass'n v. Marshall, No. W79-1223 (D.
Md., July 17, 1979) (order granting preliminary injunction).
102. Brief for the Secretary of Labor at 12, Rowland v. Marshall, 650 F.2d 28 (4th Cir.
1981). In 1981 these H-2's worked for 345 tobacco producers. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE,
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, COST DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN DOMESTIC WORKERS
AND H-2 WORKERS IN VIRGINIA WORKING ON TOBACCO FARMS, 1 (undated, unpublished
document obtained from the U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Office of the General Counsel, in
January, 1982) [hereinafter cited as COST DIFFERENTIALS IN VIRGINIA TOBACCO].
103. See, e.g., Maricopa County Organizing Project v. Glasgow, No. 79-0916 (D. Ariz.
November 13, 1980); Barrios v. Golding, No. 79-811 (D. Ariz. October 3, 1980).
104. By classifying this work as non-agricultural, non-logging employment, DOL ex-
empted the employers from the domestic recruitment obligations of 20 C.F.R. § 655, Subpart
C (1982). Seegenerally AAA Forestry Services, Inc. v. Donovan, No. 82-0318 (D.D.C. Feb. 3,
1982).
105. Cf. Florida Fruit and Vegetable Ass'n, Clearance Order of Oct. 6, 1982, 1 (number
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sugarcane in fifteen years.
IV. The Failure of the H-2 Program to Protect U.S. Farmworkers
In 1952 and again in 1965 Congress refused to either ban all contract
workers or authorize their routine admission. The H-2 provisions were
intended to set a middle course, admitting foreign workers on a case-by-
case basis only to meet proven labor shortages. The crucial determina-
tion under this approach is whether the necessary labor "cannot be
found in this country."' 1 6 The H-2 program in agriculture must be
evaluated in terms of how well this determination has been made and
enforced.
By this standard the H-2 program has failed. DOL's temporary labor
certification system is so flawed that it does not produce a meaningful
indication of whether U.S. workers are available. The Immigration and
Naturalization Service has compounded this weakness by undermining
DOL's effort to restrict H-2 admissions and leaving a vacuum in post-
admission enforcement. The federal courts have often played a simi-
larly negative role, eviscerating DOL's regulations without suggesting
how the statutory mandate could otherwise be fulfilled. These issues
are discussed below under four headings: (A) incentives encouraging
the use of H-2 workers; (B) DOL certification regulations; (C) the role of
the INS; and (D) the impact of the federal courts.
A. Incentives Encouraging The Use of H-2 Workers
To recruit migrant workers in the United States an agricultural em-
ployer must build a network of relationships with crew-leaders, family
representatives, and individual workers. He must also be willing to
make binding commitments well in advance of the season. Under the
H-2 program, however, most of the recruitment is done by the foreign
government, allowing the grower to wait until the eve of the harvest
before specifying the number of workers desired. The employer then
receives exactly the number requested, at exactly the designated time,
and is able to replace any worker who becomes ill or performs poorly.
Access to foreign labor also frees growers from dealing with the hetero-
geneous American workforce. Many U.S. migrants travel in family
groups which include women, children and older relatives, thus compli-
cating the employer's housing, recordkeeping, and supervisory obliga-
tions. The H-2 provisions enable growers to hire only young men.
requested) and Miami Herald, Jan. 12, 1983 (number certified). For growers' admissions re-
garding use of illegal aliens, see id
106. 8 U.S.C. § ll01(a)(15)(H)(ii) (1976).
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The H-2 program allows employers to avoid or defeat efforts at collec-
tive bargaining. Because any worker demanding benefits above the
DOL minimums is deemed "unavailable,"1 0 7 the H-2 program pre-
cludes meaningful negotiations. This system is ideal for frustrating even
the formation of a union, for outspoken U.S. workers can be replaced by
aliens prior to the next season.10 8
Through the H-2 program employers can avoid many provisions of
the most important federal law protecting migrant farmworkers, the Mi-
grant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act. ' 09 This statute
imposes detailed disclosure and recordkeeping requirements on those
recruiting or employing migrant workers, but provides no protection to
H-2 workers. Similarly, major tax exemptions encourage growers to
seek H-2 workers. The Federal Insurance Contribution Act ' 0 and, as
implemented in most states, the Federal Unemployment Tax Act"' ex-
empt wages paid to H-2 workers in farm jobs. Consequently, many
farm employers can realize a tax windfall of ten percent of their field
labor payroll by switching to alien workers."
12
107. See infta text at note 142.
108. Foreign laborers may not be admitted if DOL certifies that "a strike or labor dispute
involving a work stoppage is in progress" and that the admission of aliens would "adversely
affect the wages and working conditions" of U.S. workers. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(10)(i) (1982).
Accord, 20 C.F.R. § 655.203 (a) (1982). These provisions provide some protection for organiz-
ing efforts by U.S. workers during the season, but do nothing to prevent the use of H-2's to
replace such workers for the following season. Without established relationships between par-
ticular workers and the jobs at issue, which rarely exist in the fruit and vegetable harvests, it is
virtually impossible to establish that a labor dispute in effect at the end of the prior season
will continue into the coming season.
109. Pub. L. No. 97-470, 96 Stat. 2583 (1983), to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1801 (super-
ceding the Farm Labor Contract Registration Act (FLCRA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 2041-2055).
110. The social security tax of 6.7% under the Federal Insurance Contribution Act does
not apply to wages paid to "foreign agricultural workers". 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(1) (1976).
111. 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). This exemption has been extended
until January 1, 1984. Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 277 (1982). Thirty-two states have taken advan-
tage of 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(1) to exempt wages paid H-2 agricultural workers. NATIONAL
COMM'N ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION: FINAL
REPORT 24 (1980). This frees farm employers from both federal and state FUTA taxes,
which together averaged 3.1% in 1980. Id at 15, 18.
112. The Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association has estimated that the Florida sugar-
cane companies realized FICA/FUTA savings of $474 per worker during the 1980-81 season.
Immigration Reform Heanngs before the House Subcomm. On Immigration, Refugees, and International
Law, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 88, 95 (1981) (statement of George F. Sorn) [hereinafter cited as
House Hearings On Immigration Reform]. This amounts to a tax savings of $4,029,000 for the
8,500 H-2 workers in sugarcane.
Assuming an eight-week season, forty-eight hours per week at $4.89 per hour (the average
hourly earnings in the Hudson Valley in 1980), the Northeast apple producers realized a
FICA savings of $712,000 for the 5,700 H-2 positions certified in 1981. In the six Northeast-
ern states where H-2 users are exempt from FUTA taxes, the growers also realized a FUTA
savings (assuming a FUTA tax rate of 3.1%) of $172,318 on 2,971 H-2 workers. Thus the
total FICA/FUTA savings for the Northeast apple producers in 1981 can be estimated at
$884,000.
In 1981 the Mexican H-2's employed in Virginia tobacco averaged $3,391 in total earnings.
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Finally, the H-2 program grants employers an extraordinary degree of
control over the foreign workers. Growers may select from a vast supply
of willing laborers, in almost any country in the world, based solely on
business needs. Firms hiring in the U.S. are bound by equal employ-
ment and affirmative action obligations, but H-2 employers avoid these
restrictions by recruiting abroad. The United States treats foreign re-
cruitment as if it were solely a private enterprise, devoid of implications
for labor, civil rights, and diplomatic policies. Conversely, the sending
countries are intimately involved in the H-2 program but have little
leverage with which to protect their workers. Chronic unemployment
makes the H-2 program an important source of revenue and a social
"safety valve" for Jamaica, Barbados, and the other Caribbean na-
tions. 1 13 Yet the H-2 employers may shift to new labor sources at any
time.1 4 Consequently, the sending governments must acquiesce in the
COST DIFFERENTIALS IN VIRGINIA TOBACCO, supra note 102, at 1. Assuming a FUTA tax
rate of 3.1%, the Virginia tobacco growers realized a FICA/FUTA savings of $422,000 for the
1,271 H-2 workers certified for Virginia in 1981.
Growers argue that these tax savings are offset by "special costs" associated with the H-2
program. An employer seeking H-2 certification is required to provide certain benefits not
otherwise required by law. However, the only question of economic significance is whether
the H-2 benefits are above those which would be required by the forces of the market, ie.,
what would an employer be required to pay for labor if he did not use the H-2 program?
This question can be answered only through a market-by-market analysis of the wages and
working conditions offered by employers not using H-2's. Where this analysis has been done,
the findings indicate that the H-2 program rarely imposes wage, housing, transportation,
meal, or other costs which these growers would not be required to pay to recruit a U.S.
workforce. See, e.g., The H-2 Program and Nonimmigrants: Heanngs Before the Subcomm. On Imnmi-
gration and Refigee Poliy of the Senate Comm. on the Judicavy, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 177, 178, 180-
190 (statement of H. Michael Semler) (Hudson Valley market). For discussion of the rela-
tionship between the H-2 terms and local "prevailing" conditions, see infta Section IV(B).
The only expense clearly associated with H-2's but not U.S. workers is that growers using H-
2's from certain Caribbean nations (including Jamaica) must pay one percent of the workers'
wages in social security taxes to the sending country. House Heanngrs On Immigration Reform,
supra at 94 (statement of George F. Soma). Further, H-2 employers incur few special adminis-
trative expenses, for the standard contract provides that non-occupational medical insurance,
unscheduled repatriations, and INS fines may be charged to the H-2 workers themselves. See
itfa note 122.
113. Eg., ninety percent of the West Indian H-2's in Florida pay for half their families'
annual expenses with their U.S. earnings. NONIMMIGRANT WORKERS, supra note 39, at 91;
"[A] total of about $19 million was remitted to the Caribbean during 1980-81 as a result of
the H-2 program." CARIBBEAN WORKERS, supra note 78, at 54.
114. Florida growers stopped accepting H-2's from Antigua after the government insisted
that the workers be union members. P. KRAMER, THE OFFSHORES 6 (1966). Trinidad was
also excluded, in part because its workers were too outspoken: "[T]he Trinidadian as an
individual was a mistake for the program. He was not in the least docile, was quite capable of
speaking up for himself and did so vigorously." Id (statement of Fred Sikes, Vice Pres., U.S.
Sugar Corp.). Guyana was similarly excluded, partially because the growers felt Guyanese
were not sufficiently productive: "[D]espite our efforts to orient the Guyanese workers to the
U.S. system of agriculture, where a high degree of productivity is required, they were either
unwilling or unable to adjust themselves to our type of operation, since they were used to
working at a more leisurely pace back home." Id at 7 (statement of Fred Sikes, Vice Pres.,
U.S. Sugar Corp.).
208
Aliens in the Orchard
growers' demands or risk exclusion from the program. The H-2 growers
take advantage of this regulatory vacuum to recruit a prime labor force
in terms of age, ability, experience, and attitude.1 15 Workers who per-
formed unsatisfactorily in the past, filed complaints, or are otherwise
considered "troublemakers" are blacklisted." 6 The foreign workers are
without recourse against blacklisting for any reason, or for no reason
other than the whim of the employer.
The nature of the H-2 visa further enhances employer control. An H-
2 worker may work only for the petitioning employer. If this employ-
ment is terminated, for any reason, the worker is "out of status" and
potentially deportable.'t 7 Thus the employer controls the worker's very
right to remain in this country. The H-2 regulations provide many
nominal protections, but these are of little value when the employer can
render a complaining worker deportable and ensure that he never law-
fully returns. "1
H-2 workers are unable to protect themselves through collective ac-
tion. Like all agricultural workers, contract workers are outside the pro-
tection of the National Labor Relations Act. 119 Moreover, a contract
worker who engages in a strike or work stoppage is subject to deporta-
115. The screening process was described by an agent of the U.S. Sugar Corporation as
follows:
Three tables are set up, representing three stages of processing. At the first table we
simply look at the man as a physical specimen and try to eliminate those with obvious
physical defects. At the second table, we're trying to test intelligence and see if the man
can understand English as we speak it by asking certain simple questions. The third
table is where we attempt to find out about the man's work background. We also check
our black book to see if a man has been in the U.S. on contract before and has been
breached [i.e., sent home for violating the contract].
Id at 35. In 1980, a former H-2 worker described his experience in the Jamaican selection
process as follows: "IT]he people doing the selecting looked at my hands and teeth, noted any
scars or other physical marks, and asked if I was willing to work seven days a week and eat
rice and pork." Affidavit of Karl Kerr, at 1 (Feb. 21, 1980), in Rios v. Marshall, 530 F. Supp.
351 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
116. A worker who seriously displeases his employer, to the point that he is involuntarily
repatriated during the season, is placed on the black or "u-list" of unacceptables who are
forever barred from H-2 agricultural employment in the U.S. The H-2 who is u-listed is
not only fired and banned from the industry, he is for all practical purposes barred from
the U.S. labor market for life.
NONIMMIGRATION WORKERS, supra note 39, at 58.
117. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(9) (1976).
118. The Florida sugarcane companies repatriate H-2's who are anything less than docile:
Some workers are repatriated for serious personal misconduct, theft, and violence, but
most are sent home as the outgrowth of labor-management disagreements. Workers who
refuse to cut cane at the piece rate offered . . . or who noisily seek end-of-the-season
bonuses, are routinely shipped home, sometimes by the planeload.
NONIMMIGRANT WORKERS, uePra note 39, at 58.
119. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
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tion. 120 Even if striking H-2's are not deported, INS regulations provide
them no protection against the importation of other alien strikebreak-
ers. 1 2 ' The H-2 program thus brings the foreign worker to this country
in a uniquely powerless position.
22
These factors mean that many agricultural employers prefer H-2
workers even when Americans are available. As a result, DOL must
struggle not only to measure the availability of U.S. workers but also to
compel domestic recruitment by reluctant and sometimes hostile
employers.
B. The Certification Process
Only an extremely well-designed and vigorously administered recruit-
ment system could protect U.S. workers when H-2's are so attractive.
The Labor Department's certification process falls far short of this stan-
dard, for it fails to guarantee adequate employment conditions, ensure
good faith domestic recruitment, or establish effective pre- or post-ad-
mission enforcement.
1. Minimum Tems and Conditions of Employment
The Department of Labor may certify a need for foreign workers only
if their employment would not have an "adverse effect on the terms and
conditions of U.S. workers similarly employed.' 2 3 But to increase the
farm labor supply in a local market by more than 100 percent, as is
common under the H-2 program, would inevitably depress prevailing
wages if there were no further government intervention. 24 The "ad-
verse effect" standard thus gives DOL the burden of preventing defla-
120. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(9) (1976); Interview with Thomas Simmons, Examinations Div.,
INS, Washington, D.C. (March 31, 1982).
121. INS approval of H-2 visa petitions can be denied or suspended only if the presence of
the non-striking H-2 workers would have an adverse effect on "U.S. citizens or lawful perma-
nent resident workers." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(10) (1982).
122. The powerlessness of the H-2 workers is also reflected in the standard work contract.
E.g., three percent of each worker's earnings may be deducted by the employer and trans-
ferred to the British West Indies Central Labour Organisation (BWICLO) to pay for health
insurance and, in the "absolute discretion" of BWICLO, any extraordinary expenses incurred
in transporting, housing, or caring for the workers. See Paragraphs 6(a)(i) and 8(a), Agree-
ment for the Employment Of British West Indians In Agricultural Work In The United
States of America (Form A) (1981). An additional twenty-three percent may be transferred
to the Jamaican government and held as security to compensate BWICLO for any costs in-
curred in repatriating a worker or to compensate the growers for any transportation advances
not recovered. The growers may also recover from this "compelled savings" for any INS fine
or penalty. Id at paragraphs 7 and 11.
123. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(3)(i) (1982).
124. For a discussion of the relationship between wages and labor supply in the H-2 con-
text, see M. GRIFFING, IMPACT OF THE ADVERSE EFFECT WAGE RATE ON THE DOMESTIC
FARM LABOR MARKET: A THEORETICAL DISCUSSION (1976) (unpublished report by the
Bureau of Social Science Research, Washington, D.C.).
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tionary impact in a fundamentally deflationary program. As illustrated
below, the minimum terms and conditions required by the H-2 regula-
tions actually provided little or no protection for domestic workers.
The Adverse Effect Wage Rate: The centerpiece of DOL's effort to avoid
wage deflation is the "adverse effect wage rate" (AEWR), a state-by-
state earnings floor. 125 Agriculture employers seeking H-2 certification
must guarantee that each worker, U.S. and foreign, will average at least
the AEWR for each hour of work. The AEWR's for 1982 ranged from
$3.35 to $4.73.126
Since 1968 DOL has set new AEWR's each spring by increasing the
existing figures in proportion to the increase in agricultural earnings in
the relevant state during the last full year.'2 7 This methodology is seri-
ously flawed. First, the AEWR's are not based directly on current
wages, but on a series of figures (that is, the earlier AEWR's) with only
the most tenuous historical connection with actual farm earnings.'
28
Second, the AEWR methodology fails to recognize that when foreign
workers are admitted in significant numbers, they depress agricultural
wages throughout the state. DOL acknowledges the impact on local
wages, but attempts to offset this with an AEWR based on changes in a
state-wide figure which is itself depressed. Third, basing the AEWR on
125. 20 C.F.R. § 655.200(b) and .207 (1982). See also Williams v. Usery, 531 F.2d 305, 306
(5th Cir.),cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976); Rowland v. Marshall, 650 F.2d 28 (4th Cir. 1981).
126. 47 Fed. Reg. 37980 (Aug. 27, 1982); 48 Fed. Reg. 232 (January 4, 1983). See infra
note 127. Although AEWR's are calculated for all fifty states, DOL actually publishes
AEWR's in the Federal Register only for those states in which H-2's have been or are ex-
pected to be used. 20 C.F.R. § 655.207 (1982).
127. 20 C.F.R. § 655.207(b) (1982). Eg., the 1981 AEWR for New York was set by in-
creasing the 1980 AEWR for New York by the percentage increase in average hourly earnings
for field workers in New York between 1979 and 1980. In short, the AEWR's increase along
with the average earnings of farmworkers.
The Secretary of Labor was unable to rely on the traditional formula to set AEWR's for
1982 because Department of Agriculture wage rate from 1981 had not been gathered. This
led DOL to set no AEWR's for 1982 until suit was filed by U.S. farmworkers. In August,
1982, DOL agreed by consent order to begin a rulemaking to develop a new formula to set
1982 AEWR's for Maine, Vermont, and Florida (sugarcane) and to inform employers in these
states that they must establish an escrow fund for the payment of back wages. See Bragg v.
Donovan, No. 82-2361 (D.D.C. August 25, 1982). The rulemaking was completed in early
1983. 48 Fed. Reg. 2320 (Jan. 4, 1983). Farmworkers are currently seeking to compel DOL
to develop an AEWR formula for 1983. See NAACP, Jefferson County v. Donovan, No. 82-
2315 (D.D.C. 1982).
128. The early AEWR's were updated at various points without reference to farm wages,
e.g., through an adjustment tied to manufacturing wages (1965) and an across-the-board
$0.20 increase (1967). U.S. EMPLOYMENT SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HISTORY OF AD-
VERSE FORMULAS 2 (unpublished document obtained from the Office Of Technical Support,
U.S. Employment Service, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter cited as HIS-
TORY OF ADVERSE EFFECT FORMULAS]. Because each year's AEWR is based on the preceed-
ing AEWR, these early distortions are incorporated in the current AEWR's. For a valuable
discussion of the evolution of the adverse effect wage rate concept from 1951 to 1966, see
Dellon, Forezgn Agriultural Workers and the Prevention of dverse Effect, 1966 LABOR L.J. 739.
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earnings in all crops encourages wage stagnation in those crops where
earnings are above the average. Certain farm labor (including most
work performed by H-2's) is physically difficult, performed in bad
weather, located far from population centers, limited to a very short sea-
son, or otherwise so unattractive that the necessary labor will be drawn
only by a wage which is high relative to other farmwork. The AEWR is
less than this wage. Knowing that they have access to an unlimited sup-
ply of aliens at existing earnings levels, H-2 employers in these crops
have no economic reason to raise earnings over time.t
29
These factors have kept the AEWR's extremely low.1 30 Indeed, while
the AEWR appears to at least provide a special earnings floor, it is
sometimes so low that it adds nothing to the federal minimum wage
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.' 1  Regardless of the level of the
AEWR, growers can defeat its purpose by manipulating piece rates and
productivity requirements. The AEWR is an hourly guarantee, but
work in most H-2 crops is on a piece rate basis. When the AEWR in-
creases from year to year, many growers simply increase the number of
units workers are required to pick. DOL regulations prohibit such
"speed-ups," but enforcement is negligible.' 32 As a result, piece rates
fail to rise with changes in the AEWR and U.S. workers are dismissed
when they cannot meet the new "productivity minimums."
The failure of the AEWR is illustrated by wage trends in the Hudson
Valley, where Jamaican H-2's make up two-thirds of the apple harvest
workforce. Each season the state government conducts a survey to iden-
tify the prevailing wage rate among domestic workers. The survey re-
port for the Hudson Valley compares the piece rate paid to U.S. workers
employed by growers also using H-2 workers ("users") with the piece
129. Wages in H-2 states have declined relative to wages in states where H-2's have not
been used. In 1960, prior to the first use of the statewide AEWR's, the hourly wage for
farmworkers was, on the average, higher in the ten states now regularly using H-2 workers
than in the 38 continental states not regularly using H-2 workers. By 1977 farm wages in the
H-2 states had fallen below those in the non-H-2 states. NATIONAL Ass'N OF FARMWORKER
ORGANIZATIONS, ANALYSIS OF THE H-2 PROGRAM AND REQUEST FOR RULEMAKING AND
OTHER RELIEF, Exhibit No. 2 (1979).
130. Agricultural piece rate workers earned a national average of $4.61 per hour in 1980,
Crop Reporting Board, Economics and Statistical Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Farm
Labor, February 23, 1981, at 3, but the 1980 AEWR's were below $4.00 for every state but
Florida, where the AEWR was 54.09. 45 Fed. Reg. 30733, 30734 (1980).
131. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). In 1978 the AEWR's for seven states
were less than $0.18 above the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) minimum of $2.65. 42 Fed.
Reg. 32306 (1979). In 1979, 1981 and 1982 the initial AEWR's for Rhode Island and Mas-
sachusets were below the FLSA requirements; DOL set the final AEWR for these states by
raising them to the FLSA minimum. 44 Fed. Reg. 32306 (1979); 46 Fed. Reg. 19110 (1981);
47 Fed. Reg. 37980 (1982).
132. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.207(c) (1982). A federal district court found in September, 1982,
that DOL had wrongfully permitted apple producers in West Virginia to increase their pro-
ductivity requirements from year to year to offset increases in the AEWR. NAACP, Jefferson
Co. v. Donovan, No. 82-2315 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 1982).
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rate paid to U.S. workers employed by growers not using H-2 workers
("non-users"). The prevailing wage among H-2 users has consistently
been below that paid by non-users.1
33
Further, because H-2 users dominate the Hudson Valley apple mar-
ket, the overall prevailing wage is depressed. This effect can be illus-
trated by comparing the Hudson Valley with the two other areas in
New York where H-2's are used. In both of these areas-the Champlain
Valley in upstate New York and a five-county region in western New
York-foreign contract workers constitute a smaller percentage of the
workforce. The overall prevailing wage in the Hudson Valley has been
consistently lower than in areas where fewer H-2's are used.
134
Where H-2 growers dominate a market, they could block any increase
in the prevailing wage by agreeing not to offer anything above the prior
season's rate. One purpose of the AEWR is to offset this power by re-
quiring that wages increase a specified percentage each year. But the
Hudson Valley apple growers have not increased their rates in propor-
tion to the increase in the AEWR. Between 1977 and 1981 the AEWR
for New York increased twenty-eight percent, but the piece rates paid
by the Hudson Valley H-2 users increased only thirteen percent.
3 5
133.
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Users $.38 S.38 $.40 5.43 $.43
Non-Users 5.40 5.42 $.45 $.46 $.48
JOB SERv. Div., NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF LABOR, DOMESTIC AGRICULTURAL IN-SEASON
WAGE REPORTS: HUDSON VALLEY APPLE HARVEST (FRESH MARKET), No. 1 (1977-1981)
(separate reports from 1977 through 1981 seasons) [hereinafter cited, by year, as HUDSON
VALLEY WAGE REPORTS].
134.
H-2 % 1978 1979 1980 1981
Hudson Valley 66% 5.38 5.40 5.43 5.43
Champlain Valley 49% S.45 S.45 S.50
Western New York 8% $.45 S.46 5.50 5.55
1977-1981 HUDSON VALLEY WAGE REPORTS, SUpra note 133, at No. 1; JOB SERV. DIV., NEW
YORK STATE DEP'T OF LABOR, DOMESTIC AGRICULTURAL IN-SEASON WAGE REPORTS:
CLINTON, ESSEX/WASHINGTON COUNTIES APPLE HARVEST (FRESH MARKET), No. 1 (1977-
81) (separate reports for 1977 through 1981 seasons in Champlain Valley); JOB SERV. Div.,
NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF LABOR, DOMESTIC AGRICULTURAL IN-SEASON WAGE RE-
PORTS: AGRICULTURAL AREAS I AND II (FRESH MARKET) No. 1 (1977-1981) (separate re-
ports for 1977 through 1981 seasons in western New York). No prevailing rates were
published for the 1981 harvest in the Champlain Valley, but no grower in this area paid less
than 5.50 per box. The percentage of H-2 penetration refers to the 1981 season.
135. The New York AEWR increased from $2.70 in 1977, to $3.48 in 1981. 42 Fed. Reg.
40192,40193 (1977); 46 Fed. Reg. 19110-11 (1981). Piece rates increased from $0.38 to 50.43.
See supra note 133.
Even more telling is the disparity between the increase in the AEWR and the change in
actual earnings: Between 1977 and 1981 the average hourly earnings of the domestic apple
workers surveyed in the Hudson Valley increased only four percent, from $4.76 to $4.95.
1977 AND 1981 HUDSON VALLEY WAGE REPORTS, supra note 133, at No. 5.
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Family Housing: Agricultural employers seeking H-2 certification must
offer free housing to workers not within commuting distance. However,
separate sleeping quarters for families must be provided only when this
is the "prevailing practice" in the area. 136 Most growers offer only bar-
racks housing. The lack of privacy inherent in common sleeping
quarters closes these jobs to women and to workers traveling in family
units.
This situation illustrates two problems running throughout the H-2
regulations. First, identical treatment of U.S. and foreign workers is not
automatically sufficient to prevent an adverse effect on U.S. workers.
The expectations of domestic workers are often different, and in some
areas more demanding, than those of the foreign workforce selected by
the growers. 137 Second, the certification regulations frequently require
only that the grower conform to local "prevailing practice." Because
agricultural working conditions have historically been depressed, this
prevailing practice standard operates as a grandfathering provision, per-
manently tying farm jobs to outdated employment conditions.
Travel Advances: H-2 growers must offer "travel advances" to assist
U.S. workers in reaching the orchards if this is the common practice in
the local area or if the H-2 workers receive advances. 3 The apple pro-
ducers traditionally provided advances to the Jamaican workers and,
consequently, to any domestic workers needing advances. In 1977 these
growers refused to offer advances to U.S. workers on the ground that
Jamaican workers would not receive advances. Yet it was subsequently
learned that the H-2's were provided travel advances by the Jamaican
government. DOL then revised its regulations to prevent this type of
manipulation, requiring that transportation funds be advanced to U.S.
workers "if. . .foreign workers receive such advances directly from the
employer or indirectly from any person, agency, or other entity which is
collaborating with the employer.' 39 Nevertheless, the apple growers
continue to refuse to offer advances to U.S. workers, claiming that since
1978 the advances to the Jamaicans have been provided by a source in
136. 20 C.F.R. § 655.202(b)(1) (1982).
137. The different housing needs of U.S. and foreign workers arise out of the employers'
recruitment practices, ie., although INS regulations permit H-2 workers to bring their depen-
dents, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1) (1982), employers will hire only males willing to travel alone.
Most other differences in the needs of U.S. and foreign workers are rooted in the vast eco-
nomic and social disparties between the United States and the sending countries. H-2 em-
ployers recruit among the rural poor in pre-irdustrial societies, taking advantage of high
unemployment, low expectations and, the fact that U.S. dollars are more valuable in the
Caribbean or Mexico than in the U.S. See generally CARIBBEAN WORKERS, supra note 78, at
15-61 (sociological analysis of the background of the Jamaican sugarcane cutters).
138. 20 C.F.R. § 655.202(b)(5) (1982). See alro 20 C.F.R. § 653.501(d)(5) (1982).
139. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.202(a) (1982) (promulgated at 43 Fed. Reg. 10306, 10308
(1978)).
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Jamaica unrelated to the growers or the Jamaican government.'40 The
growers are at least partially responsible for this arrangement and the
Jamaican funding source is clearly "collaborating with the employ-
ers,' 14 1 but DOL nevertheless accepts the apple orders with no provision
for travel advances for U.S. workers. Thus, only alien workers are regu-
larly able to obtain financial assistance to reach the apple orchards.
DOL Minimums As A "Ceiling": The minimum employment terms
were designed to set a floor on working conditions, but DOL also uses
these provisions as a ceiling. A domestic farmworker who demands a
higher wage or better conditions-no matter how slight the demand-is
deemed unavailable. H-2 employers are thus assured an unlimited sup-
ply of labor (U.S. or foreign) at the minimums set by the government.
This anomalous application of the H-2 regulations was upheld by the
First Circuit in Hernandez Flecha v. Qui'ros . 142 Puerto Rican farmworkers
challenged DOL's decision to certify apple growers who refused to re-
cruit in Puerto Rico because the Commonwealth was attempting to ne-
gotiate better terms for its workers.143  The First Circuit rejected
plaintiffs' argument, finding that "a worker who is not able and willing
to enter into a contract of employment upon the U.S. conditions is not
available within the statutory meaning. . . ,,144 In fact, the court
barred all bargaining by U.S. workers within the H-2 program.
4 5
The Hernandez Flecha opinion is strangely blind to the pricing mecha-
nism which would set wages if U.S. workers were free to negotiate. The
First Circuit assumed that wages must be either frozen at the DOL min-
imum or set at the highest level demanded by any worker. But there is
an intermediate position: determination by the market. If earnings
were increased to the point that growers could satisfy their labor needs
140. Letter from Harold F. Edwards, Chief Liaison Officer, British West Indies Central
Labour Organisation, to William B. Lewis, U.S. Employment Serv., U.S. Dep't of Labor
(May 25, 1978).
141. Supra note 139. For example, during the negotiations between the H-2 users and the
Caribbean Regional Labor Board each Spring the parties discuss "[r]equests by Jamaican
banks that employers honor the voluntary assignments to . . . banks of any travel expense
reimbursement as collateral for travel advance loans." Stipulations and Admissions by Flor-
ida Sugar Defendants, (submitted by Florida Fruit and Vegetable Ass'n and Florida Sugar
Producers Ass'n) at 15, Rios v. Marshall, 530 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
142. 567 F.2d 1154 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied 436 U.S. 945 (1978).
143. For discussion of the role of the Commonwealth in recruitment in Puerto Rico, stee
infra text accompanying note 155.
144. 567 F.2d at 1157.
145. [T]he question is the same whether the Puerto Rican workers' insistence upon [Pu-
erto Rican] conditions was made for them by the legislature, or by the P.R. Secretary, or
was due to insistence by a union to which they all belonged, or was merely the result of
Puerto Rican workers not finding U.S. conditions sufficiently attractive, and demanding
more on an individual basis. Our decision covers all these matters ....
567 F.2d at 1155-56.
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with U.S. workers, there would be no need to rule on the availability of
an individual willing to work only at some higher rate. Further, the
First Circuit was needlessly disturbed by the workers' attempt to negoti-
at6 for higher wages while their employers had no reciprocal right to
argue for wages below the DOL minimums. 146 Negotiation within a
minimum wage framework is, of course, routine. Nothing in the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act or its legislative history suggests that the H-
2 provisions were intended to bind U.S. farmworkers to work only at a
wage set by the government.
147
Finally, Heranadez Flecha ignores the freedom of the sending countries
to contract for any additional benefits they can extract from the grow-
ers. Benefits obtained for foreign workers must then also be provided to
domestic workers. This means that growers, the U.S. government, and
the sending nations may affect the conditions under which the U.S.
workers are employed, but domestic workers themselves cannot.
2. Domestic Recruitment Requirements
The intensity of the growers' recruitment effort largely determines
whether U.S. workers can be hired. The domestic recruitment required
of H-2 employers appears imposing on paper, but in reality it is narrow,
passive, and often intentionally unproductive.
Exclusive Reliance on the Employment Service: The certification process
rests almost entirely on recruitment through the employment service sys-
tem. This cripples the effort from the outset for the interstate clearance
system is cumbersome and slow. The complexity of the job orders, em-
ployer reluctance to cooperate with DOL procedures, and the delays
inherent in a multi-level bureaucratic process mean that the job orders
are rarely accepted by DOL until three weeks after they have been filed.
At least another week is consumed in sending the orders to the appropri-
ate states in the South and Southwest. Thus, one-half of the sixty-day
recruitment period has often elapsed before the orders are even received
in the states likely to have available workers. Additional delays then
arise in these "labor supply" states, where the employment service per-
sonnel are tied to the farm community and often share the growers' in-
terest in retaining local labor. i48 As a result it is not unusual for the job
orders to be actually available in the local offices for only two or three
146. See 567 F.2d at 1156 n.1.
147. Cf 20 C.F.R. § 656.40(a)(2)(ii) (1982) (in the permanent labor certification context,
employers must offer at least the local union wage even if this exceeds what would otherwise
be the prevailing rate).
148. For a discussion of the traditional ties between state employment service agencies
and agricultural employers, see NAACP, Western Region v. Brennan, 360 F. Supp. 1006,
1009-10 (D.D.C. 1973).
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weeks of the mandated sixty-day recruitment period. In some cases the
job orders are never made available. 149
Moreover, most migrant farmworkers do not frequent the employ-
ment service offices. Relatively few out-of-state agricultural jobs are of-
fered through this system,1' °  and most workers arrange their
employment through crewleaders or set out as "free wheelers," finding
work as they travel. Consequently, even the job orders displayed in the
employment service offices on a timely basis never come to the attention
of the majority of domestic migrants. 5 1
Pro Forma Recruitment: Most migrant farmworkers have little formal
education, are intimidated by written material, and choose their work
on the basis of oral commitments. The interstate clearance system func-
tions on an entirely different level, asking workers to commit themselves
to a job hundreds of miles away on the basis of a complex document
submitted by a stranger. 52 This system can work only if employers
make aggressive, good faith efforts to bridge the gap between offer and
acceptance. Growers seeking certification rarely make these special ef-
forts, for their goal is to establish that no U.S. workers are available.
Most H-2 employers do not send recruiters to the labor supply states,
accept collect telephone calls, provide travel advances, encourage crew-
leaders to bring crews to the worksite 53 or otherwise make affirmative
efforts beyond the minimums required by DOL. The job orders are usu-
ally submitted only at the filing deadline, even though this means they
do not reach Texas and Florida until well after the workers have joined
149. E.g., although North Carolina is a major employment area for farmworkers in June
and July, the North Carolina employment service officials each year refuse to display orders
for the apple harvest in Virginia or West Virginia, on the ground that there are no available
workers in the state. Interview with Richard Panati, Certifying Officer, U.S. Employment
Serv., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Philadelphia, Pa. (August 12, 1981).
150. In FY 1980 there were 2,600 agricultural job orders circulated through the interstate
clearance order system. EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LA-
BOR, REPORTS H AND K: INTERSTATE AND INTRASTATE CLEARANCE ORDERS, PERIOD
ENDING 9/80, 2 (1980).
151. There are an estimated 800,000 domestic migrant farmworkers and their depen-
dents. See, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. REP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 1978
MIGRANT HEALTH PROGRAM TARGET POPULATION ESTIMATES 3 (1980). In FY 1980 these
workers filed 75,990 applications at employment service offices. EMPLOYMENT AND TRAIN-
ING ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT SERVICE AUTOMATED RE-
PORTING SYSTEM: TABLE 06, at 002 (1980).
152. The H-2 job orders often run more than fifteen tightly spaced pages, using difficult
and legalistic language. See, e.g., Florida Fruit and Vegetable Ass'n, Clearance Order No.
2723402 (June 26, 1981) (37 pages); Rinehart Orchards, Inc., Clearance Order No. 3007916
(1981) (24 pages).
153. In some instances growers actively discourage crewleaders, e.g., Max Sontheim,
Clearance Order No. 2504703 (1978) ("No crew will be accepted"); Sprong Fruit Farm,
Clearance Order No. 2504401 (1978) ("No crew leader accepted'); Allbright Farm, Clearance
Order No. 2504003 (1978) ("No labor contractor accepted').
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the migrant stream. 154
Refusal To Hire Puerto Rican Workers: As U.S. citizens, Puerto Ricans
are entitled to preference in U.S. employment. Much of the recent his-
tory of the H-2 program has been written in terms of the struggle over
whether Puerto Rican farmworkers would be recruited for work in the
apple harvest. The focal point of this conflict has been Puerto Rico's
Public Law 87, which provides that no person may be recruited on the
island except under a contract approved by the Commonwealth. 155
From 1975 through 1977 the Commonwealth attempted to place its
farmworkers under a contract calling for benefits above the DOL mini-
mums,' 56 but DOL ruled that the Puerto Rican workers were "unavail-
able." 157 In 1978, however, the growers lost any claim that Puerto
Rican workers were unavailable, for the Commonwealth waived its de-
mand for benefits above the regulatory minimums. DOL then assisted
in transporting 992 workers from Puerto Rico to orchards throughout
the Northeast. Many were never given an opportunity to work, 158 while
others were quickly dismissed or given such poor assignments that they
left voluntarily. Only ninety-seven Puerto Ricans were still employed
fifteen days after the beginning of the harvest. 159
154. DOL requires sixty days of domestic recruitment before certification, 20 C.F.R.
§ 655.201(c) (1981), and the employers need two to three weeks after certification to bring the
H-2 workers to the orchards. Thus the job orders must be filed approximately eighty days
before the date of need. Most apple orders are filed only at this time. See, e.g., Chick
Orchards, Inc., Clearance Order No. 0610972 (filed June 19, 1981) (largest H-2 user in
Maine; 90 days before date of need); Tri-County Growers, Inc., Clearance Order No. 0417828
(filed June 18, 1981) (largest H-2 user in W. Va.; 81 days before date of need). More than 70
precent of the migrant workers wintering in Florida have set out for work by the end of May.
LEGAL SERVICES CORP., AN ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF MIGRANT AND SEASONAL
FARMWORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RIcO 60-61
(1977).
155. Act No. 87 of June 22, 1962, 29 L.P.R.A. §§ 526-534.
156. E.g., in 1975 the Commonwealth made four demands which exceeded the H-2 mini-
mums: that contract disputes be adjudicated in Puerto Rico; that hot meals be served; that
more extensive insurance protection be provided; and that the growers post a performance
bond. Galan v. Dunlop, 411 F. Supp. 268, 270 (D.D.C. 1976).
157. In 1976 the Commonwealth ultimately acquiesced to the growers' contract demands
and approximately 600 Puerto Ricans were recruited. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RECRUITING AND PLACING PUERTO RI-
CAN WORKERS WITH GROWERS DURING THE 1978 APPLE HARVEST WERE UNSUCCESSFUL,
APPENDIX I at 9 (1980) [hereinafter cited as COMPTROLLER'S REPORT ON 1978 APPLE
HARVEST].
158. Eg., of the 554 Puerto Ricans sent to Virginia and West Virginia, 198 (35%) were
never hired. See COMPTROLLER'S REPORT ON THE 1978 APPLE HARVEST, supra note 157, at
2.
159. COMPTROLLER'S REPORT ON THE 1978 APPLE HARVEST, supra note 157, at 2. Ap-
proximately $275,000 in Comprehensive Education and Training Act (CETA) funding was
used to transport these workers to and from the mainland and to purchase room and board.
Id By terminating the workers before fifty percent of the harvest was completed, the employ-
ers avoided responsibility for the transportation and subsistence costs.
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The refusal to accept Puerto Rican workers in 1978 was a direct chal-
lenge to DOL's control of the certification process. DOL retreated from
this challenge. Over 200 formal administrative complaints were filed by
Puerto Rican workers, 60 but not one employer was sanctioned. Fearing
reenactment of this fiasco, the Commonwealth refused to waive Public
Law 87 in 1979 and no Puerto Ricans worked in the apple harvest. The
Puerto Rican contract requirements have been waived each year since
1979, but few Puerto Ricans have been hired. 16 1 The apple producers
have thus largely succeeded in closing the harvest jobs to U.S. citizens in
Puerto Rico, solely on the basis of their preference for alien workers.
3. Sancttons and Enforcement
The Department of Labor can compel growers to solicit U.S. workers
only by threatening to withhold certification. In one sense this is a pow-
erful tool, for an unexpected denial of access to H-2's could seriously
disrupt traditional H-2 users. Yet the very power of this sanction limits
its usefulness, for DOL is understandably wary about causing (or being
blamed for) the failure of a harvest. In another sense denial of certifica-
tion is too weak to be effective, for both the INS and the federal courts
have failed to provide consistent support for DOL's certification deci-
sions. 162 Consequently, employers know that they will not necessarily
lose access to H-2 workers if DOL refuses to certify. This has deprived
DOL of much of its control over H-2 admissions.
The absence of adequate sanctions also cripples post-admission en-
forcement. DOL has disavowed any authority under the H-2 provisions
to enjoin ongoing violations, sue for back-wages, or impose fines.163 The
only remaining penalty for post-certification abuses is denial of certifica-
tion for future seasons. But even this is more theory than practice.
DOL has never actually barred a grower from using H-2's as a conse-
quence for violations committed during a prior season.164
160. Id, Appendix I, at 19-20.
161. No more than 250 workers have been recruited from Puerto Rico for any apple
harvest since 1979. Telephone Interview with Kenneth Bell, Labor Cert. Div., U.S. Employ-
ment Service, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 23, 1981).
162. Set injfa Section IV(C) and (D).
163. Cf. West. Colo. Fruit Growers Ass'n v. Marshall, 473 F. Supp. 693 (D. Colo. 1973),
where DOL filed counterclaims after the season to recover wages due U.S. workers and enjoin
future violations. The monetary counterclaims were dismissed on the ground that DOL had
no authority to pursue such claims. 473 F. Supp. 696-700.
164. Telephone interview with Gil Apodoca, National Monitor Advocate, Employment
Service, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Washington, D.C. (March 23, 1983); Telephone interview with
Aaron Bodin, Manpower Development Specialist, U.S. Employment Service, U.S. Dep't of
Labor, Washington, D.C. (March 23, 1983). See znfta note 230.
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C. The Role of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
Although final responsibility lies with the Commissioner of the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service, the administration of the H-2 pro-
gram has been transferred to the Department of Labor. This is a sound
administrative decision, well-grounded in the prior temporary labor
programs, the legislative history of the H-2 provisions, and the relative
expertise of the agencies. However, this structure has been undermined
by INS's failure to support the efforts to restrict H-2 admissions. INS
has never refused H-2 visas after DOL certified a need for agricultural
workers. 165 Similar deference to decisions denying certification would
give DOL meaningful control of the H-2 program. But INS is willing to
intervene to protect grower interests. For example, in 1977 workers in
the Presidio Valley of Texas requested 809 Mexican workers but refused
to provide housing, pay the adverse effect wage rate, or comply with
other H-2 requirements. Nevertheless, at the urging of President
Carter, 166 the Commissioner of the INS overruled his regional office and
admitted all the H-2's requested.
16 7
The refusal of INS to play any role in post-admission enforcement
also has hobbled the H-2 program. INS makes no effort to monitor the
treatment of the foreign workers and rarely imposes sanctions for viola-
tions identified by other agencies. In fact, some immigration officials
doubt that INS could terminate an approved H-2 visa petition despite
an employer's disregard of his statements in the petition.'6 a In any
165. Interview with Thomas Simmons, Examinations Div., INS, Washington, D.C.
(March 31, 1982); Interview with Kellogg Whittick, District Director, INS, Washington, D.C.
(April 2, 1982).
166. "But the farmers' past record of lawbreaking, and their unwillingness to provide
proper living conditions and wages for workers, did not stop Carter from intervening person-
ally to overturn the decisions of both the INS and the Labor Department." Los Angeles
Times, June 24, 1977, Part II, at 6, col. 1.
167. 809 Agricultural Workers, Beneficiaries of Two Visa Petitions Filed By Presidio Val-
ley Farmers' Ass'n, Nos. ELP-N-1387 and ELP-N-1388 (INS, U.S. Dep't of Justice, June 9,
1977). Wage and hour investigators subsequently reported that many of these H-2 workers
earned less than the federal minimum wage of $2.20 per hour, some receiving as little as $0.60
per hour. Transcript of Proceedings at 174-175 (May 25, 1978) (testimony of James L. Wil-
liams, Wage and Hour Div., U.S. Dep't of Labor), Presidio Valley Farmers' Ass'n v. Mar-
shall, No. EP-78-CA-95 (S.D. Tex. May 26, 1978) (oider granting preliminary injunction),
appeal dismssed as moot, 617 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1980).
INS overruled DOL's denial of certification on at least two other occasions: in extending
the visas of West Indian H-2's in Florida in 1965 and in admitting Canadian H-2's for logging
jobs in New England during the Nixon Administration. NONIMMIGRANT WORKERS, supra
note 39, at 27.
168. E.g., in discussing the options available when he was told that the Presidio Valley
growers were not complying with their statements in the visa petitions, see infa note 169, the
Commissioner of the INS stated that he had "no other authority" than to refer the matter to
DOL. Deposition of Leonel J. Castillo, October 11, 1977, at 44, Montelongo v. Bell, No. B-
77-167 (S.D. Texas, filed July 11, 1977). Other immigration officials suggest, persuasively,
that a revocation could be effected pursuant to INS's authority to "reopen" its prior approval
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event, an effort to terminate approval of a H-2 petition definitely would
require a lengthy administrative effort. INS has never attempted to de-
prive a farm employer of his H-2 workers after the season has begun,
even in the face of egregious violations.1
69
Nor has INS exercised its authority to impose monetary sanctions. In
lieu of posting bond, many H-2 employers sign an agreement providing
that the foreign workers will be employed only "in strictest compliance
with the terms of the visa petition."' 1 70 This agreement further provides
that "liquidated damages" of $10.00 shall be paid to INS for each viola-
tion of its terms. Thus the government has an enforcement tool which
penalizes only the employer (that is, the H-2 worker need not be denied
further employment), imposes potentially significant but not cata-
strophic penalties, and is free from legal question. Yet the liquidated
damages agreement is used solely to ensure that the H-2 workers depart
after the season, not to enforce the promised terms and conditions of
employment. 17
D. The Role of the Federal Courts
In 1974 a New England apple producer obtained H-2 workers by
court order,17 2 the first time since at least 1965 that a grower successfully
attacked DOL's certification decision.' 73  Judicial challenges have
grown steadily since that ruling. During the last nine years at least fifty
of a petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 (1982). Interview with Thomas Simmons, Examinations Div.,
INS, Washington, D.C. (March 30, 1982); Interview with Michael Heilman, Office of the
General Counsel, INS, Washington, D.C. (April 7, 1982).
169. E.g., an INS investigation in July, 1977, showed that the Mexican H-2 workers ad-
mitted to Presidio, Texas, were working only 25-30 hours per week and were compelled to pay
their own transportation, both in violation of the employer's promises in the visa petition. On
this basis the investigator recommended that approval be revoked. Memorandum from Ar-
nold Flores to Leonel Castillo, Commissioner of the INS, at 3-5 (July 12, 1977). The INS
neither withdrew its approval nor imposed any other sanction.
170. INS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FORM 1-320B No. 1 (Rev. 9-1-75).
171. Interview with Thomas Simmons, Examinations Div., INS, Washington, D.C.
(March 30, 1982); Interview tih Kellogg Whittick, District Director, INS, Washington, D.C.
(April 2, 1982).
172. Elton Orchards, Inc. v. Brennan, No. 74-276 (D.N.H. Sept. 17, 1974) (order granting
preliminary injunction). The First Circuit reversed, but only after the employer had enjoyed
access to H-2 workers for the full season. 508 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1974).
173. Research reveals only five cases filed between 1965 and 1974 dealing with H-2 certi-
fication decisions in agriculture. In 1965 Florida growers unsuccessfully challenged DOL's
refusal to certify H-2's in Florida. Chase Glades Farms v. Wirtz, No. 65-86 (M.D. Fla. July
19, 1966). Three cases were filed in 1967 and 1968 on behalf of California farmworkers seek-
ing to halt the admission of Mexican H-2's. These cases were settled and no H-2's were
admitted. Alaniz v. Wirtz, No. 478-07 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 1967); Ortiz v. Wirtz, No. 47803
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 1967); Ortiz v. Wirtz, No. 48685 (N.D. Cal. March 27, 1968). Finally, in
1972 the United Farm Workers' union unsuccessfully challenged a DOL decision to certify H-
2 workers for the sugarcane work in Florida. United Farm Workers v. Kleindeinst, No. 72-
1439 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 1973).
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cases have been filed in connection with the use of foreign labor in agri-
culture, many of which have affected an entire harvest. This litigation
has sorely tested the judicial system. Certification cases often reach the
courts only days before the season, under conditions which would strain
the most able and dispassionate jurist. 'Even allowing for these condi-
tions, however, a number of courts have shown surprisingly little regard
for the purpose of the H-2 program, DOL's labor market expertise, or
even the normal limits of judicial review. Consequently, the federal ju-
diciary has largely impaired and destablized the certification process.
The following section identifies three problems confronted by the courts
in H-2 litigation and illustrates these problems through discussion of five
related cases from the Western District of Virginia.
1. Absence of an Administrative Record
The DOL certification requirement is intended to ensure that the
agency with the greatest labor market expertise makes the initial finding
as to whether U.S. workers are available. This system assumes that judi-
cial review will be based on the combined DOL/INS administrative rec-
ord. Yet when DOL refuses to accept a job order because the employer
has not offered the required terms, the dispute is often in litigation
before any recruitment has been done. If these cases were filed well
before the harvest, the court could rule on the disputed issue and return
the matter to DOL for recruitment. But negotiations over the job order
often continue for weeks after the filing deadline. Moreover, some grow-
ers engage in deliberate brinksmanship, refusing to either amend their
orders or move promptly to challenge DOL's rejection. If DOL refuses
to concede, the growers turn to the courts for "emergency" relief, citing
the prospect of crops "rotting in the fields." Regardless of the merits of
the dispute over the job order, the court must confront the ultimate
question-whether to admit H-2 workers. But the court has no record
of recruitment, no administrative finding as to availability, and no time
for a remand. This last-second fact finding defeats the purpose of the
certification system. The federal judiciary does not have the expertise or
the mechanisms to determine in the first instance whether U.S. workers
can be found.
2. Disregard of Preiminag, Relief Standards
Litigants are ordinarily entitled to preliminary relief only after estab-
lishing, inter a&a, that they will suffer irreparable harm absent judicial
intervention. 174 In certification cases the growers base their request for
174. Brown v. Chote, 41 U.S. 452, 455-457 (1973); 11 C. WRIGHT AND A. MILLER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948, at 431-441 (1973).
222
Vol. 1:187, 1983
Aliens in the Orchard
relief on sweeping claims of imminent crop loss. 17 5 Rarely is detailed
information offered to support these claims. Moreover, even if it were
shown that the full crop could not be harvested by U.S. workers, this
would not prove serious financial loss, for farmers frequently limit the
supply of agricultural produce to raise or maintain prices. The financial
significance of a labor shortage depends on the relative size of the crop,
the current demand, the competing supply, shipping costs, price elastic-
ity, alternative marketing possibilities, and a complex variety of other
factors. Rather than delving into these issues, the courts have accepted
the employer's financial claims at face value.
The judiciary has been unresponsive, however, to the harm caused by
preliminary orders admitting foreign workers. When aliens are admit-
ted without the required domestic recruitment, U.S. farmworkers are
denied employment. 76 When contract workers are admitted on terms
below the DOL minimums, working conditions are undermined. Im-
providently granted relief also frustrates consistent administration of the
certification system, particularly in view of the difficulty of overcoming
the mootness barrier to appellate review.
3. Mootness
An appeal of a preliminary order admitting foreign workers will
rarely be heard before the visas have expired. Mootness is avoided in
comparable situations on the rationale that the problem is "capable of
repetition, yet evading review."'1 77 Nevertheless, three of the four cir-
cuits which have faced this issue have ruled that the end of the harvest
moots the appeal of a preliminary order affecting H-2 certification.
The First Circuit is willing to hear an appeal in this situation. In Elton
Orchards v. Brennan that court reversed a preliminary order affecting cer-
tification even though the season had ended, on the ground that "the
175. Eg., "[A]bsence of the required labor force to harvest plaintiff growers' crops com-
mencing in early September will result in the ruination of an estimate (sic) one-half (1/2) or
better of the total crop, a loss of several million bushels of apples." Complaint at 6, Frederick
County Fruit Growers' Ass'n v. Marchall, 436 F. Supp. 218 (W.D. Va. 1977).
176. Two factors obscure the harm caused U.S. migrants by the admission of H-2 workers
without the required recruitment. First, because the jobs have not been adequately adver-
tised, few interested domestic workers have been identified. Second, DOL regulations appear
to guarantee that all workers who appear at the worksite will be hired, even after certification
has been granted. 20 C.F.R. § 655.203(e) (1982) (employer shall hire all qualified U.S. work-
ers who apply before half of the H-2 contract period has elapsed). But this provision has little
operative impact, for employers have not been required to discharge the H-2 workers or to
provide additional housing. See COMPTROLLER'S REPORT ON THE 1978 APPLE HARVEST,
supra note 157, APPENDIX I, at 18 (Puerto Ricans turned away from the labor camps because
the housing was filled by Jamaicans). Once the H-2's are admitted, U.S. migrants are guar-
anteed only jobs and beds which are already filled.
177. See, e.g., Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115 (1974); U.S. v. Ore-
gon, 657 F.2d 1009, 1012 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981).
223
Yale Law & Policy Review
district court's opinion in this case, if allowed to stand, would have a
substantial impact on the Department of Labor's treatment of. . . [fu-
ture] requests." 178 No other circuit has followed this reasoning. In Galan
v. Usery the District of Columbia Circuit refused to review an order up-
holding DOL's certifications for the 1975 apple harvest, even though the
appeal involved "questions of law which conceivably can recur as an-
other harvest season approaches."' 179 In three cases filed in 1977 and
1978, all captioned Frederick County Fruit Growers' Association v. Marshall,
the Fourth Circuit dismissed efforts by DOL to appeal preliminary or-
ders affecting certification, 8 0 finding that "[w]ith the passage of the...
apple season, the . . . injunction is obviously mooted."'' Finally, in
Presidio Valley Farmers"Association v. Marshall, the Fifth Circuit refused for
the same reason to review a preliminary order compelling DOL to ad-
mit Mexican H-2's for the 1978 season.
8 2
The mootness barrier could conceivably be overcome through expe-
dited appeal. In practice, however, even expedited processing is un-
likely to bring a decision before the termination of the H-2 visas. In
Elton Orchards, Hernandez Flecha ,183 and two of the Frederick County cases
the appellate courts did expedite the appeal, yet no decision was
reached until after the season. No H-2 case has been found in which an
appeal was decided before the end of the harvest. A preliminary injunc-
tion may, of course, be brought before an appellate court on a motion to
stay, but this gives the petitioner a significantly greater burden.1" 4 In
the H-2 context this burden has proven insurmountable. Although
DOL routinely requests this relief, no case has been found in which an
appellate court has stayed an order admitting H-2 workers.
Rigid application of the mootness doctrine has thus made it virtually
impossible to challenge preliminary orders compelling the admission of
H-2 workers--orders which ordinarily determine the final outcome of
the litigation. As a result, the federal trial courts exercise broad author-
178. 508 F.2d 493, 498 n.6 (lst Cir. 1974). The First Circuit reached this conclusion again
three years later in Hernandez Flecha v. Quiros, 567 F.2d 1154, 1157 (1st Cir. 1977), cert.
dented 436 U.S. 945 (1978).
179. No. 76-1019, slip op. at 2-3 (D.C. Cir. March 10, 1977), dimissing appealfiom Galan
v. Dunlop, 411 F. Supp. 268 (D.D.C. 1975).
180. Nos. 77-2042 and 77-2170 (consolidated) (4th Cir. Nov. 9, 1977) (order dismissing
appeals of preliminary injunctions); No. 78-1608 (4th Cir. March 20, 1979) (order dismissing
appeal of preliminary injunction). See infra Section IV(D)(4).
181. No. 78-1608, slip op. at 4-5 (4th Cir. March 20, 1979).
182. 617 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1980).
183. 567 F.2d 1154 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied 436 U.S. 945 (1978). See supra text accompa-
nying note 141.
184. The parties seeking a stay must establish, inter a/ia, that they will suffer irreparable
harm, that no substantial harm will be suffered by other interested parties, 11 C. WRIGHT
AND A. MILLER, supra note 174, § 2904, at 316, and that the district court abused its discre-
tion in not issuing the stay, 7 J. MOORE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 62.05, at 62-22 (2d
ed. 1979).
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ity over H-2 admissions without the benefit of either prior appellate gui-
dance or the sobering expectation of appellate review.
4. "The Virgnia Connection"
Five H-2 cases have been decided by the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Virginia since 1977,185 giving this court a powerful
influence on the recent operation of the H-2 program. This influence
has been used to defend employer interests and limit DOL's control over
the admission of foreign workers. The government has never won an
agricultural H-2 case in this court.
The first H-2 litigation to come before the Western District of Vir-
ginia was Frederick Count' Fruit Growers' Association v. Marshall (Frederick
County 1), an action filed by Virginia apple producers in July, 1977, to
compel DOL to accept job orders without any provision for travel ad-
vances for U.S. workers.' 8 6 The central question was whether employers
in the area of intended employment had "commonly provided" travel
advances. H-2 employers in Virginia had clearly been offering ad-
vances. 187 Nevertheless, the day after the growers' complaint was filed,
Judge Ted Dalton entered a temporary restraining order compelling
DOL to accept the disputed job orders. Two weeks later the court en-
tered a preliminary injunction to the same effect, based on a finding
that Virginia growers not using H-2 workers ordinarily provided travel
advances only through their crewleaders. This decision failed to recog-
nize DOL's principal contention that if the crewleader is not provided
an advance, the grower must be willing to do so. The decision also mis-
takenly emphasized protecting consumers from high prices rather than
the intended goal of the H-2 program-preventing the displacement of
U.S. workers.'88 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit denied DOL's request
to stay the preliminary injunction. When finally heard three months
later, the appeal was dismissed as moot because the season had ended.
Anticipating a decision on the merits, the Fourth Circuit remanded to
the district court with instructions "to decide promptly whether or not
to issue apermanent injunction, so that, if necessary, this court can resolve
the dispute in ample time before the 1978 harvest." 189 However, on re-
mand Judge James Turk granted the growers' motion to dismiss as
185. The Western District of Virginia encompasses the apple producing regions near the
Shenandoah Mountains and much of the tobacco area along the Virginia-North Carolina
border. During the period relevant here there were two active judges in this district, James C.
Turk and Glen M. Williams, and one senior judge, Ted Dalton.
186. 436 F. Supp. 218 (W.D. Va. 1977) (order granting preliminary injunction). The
travel advance issue is discussed supra in text accompanying note 138.
187. 436 F. Supp. at 224.
188. Id at 225.
189. No. 77-2042, slip op. at 2 (4th Cir. Nov. 9, 1977) (emphasis in original).
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moot. 90 Thus, there was never a decision on the merits as to the travel
advance question in Virginia.
In August, 1977, the apple growers filed a second suit in the Western
District, Frederick County Frutl Growers' Association v. Marshall (Frederick
Couny 1 ),191 seeking to compel DOL to issue certifications for the entire
Northeastern apple harvest. At 11:15 AM on the day the complaint was
filed, Judge Turk entered a temporary restraining order requiring the
government to admit the number of workers sought by the growers.
The Fourth Circuit refused to stay the district court order or to expedite
the appeal. When the preliminary order was considered in November,
the appeal was dismissed because the season had ended. 92 On remand
DOL sought to secure a final ruling on the obligation to hire Puerto
Rican workers, but Judge Turk held that the entire case was moot.
In 1978 apple producers from New York, Maryland, Virginia and
West Virginia filed a third suit in the Western District, Frederick County
Fruit Growers' Association v. Marshall (Frederick County III), 19 3 challenging
DOL's decision denying certification to certain growers because Puerto
Rican workers were available. On the day the complaint was filed,
Judge Turk entered a temporary restraining order (TRO) granting the
growers all the H-2's sought. DOL's request to reduce the number of
Jamaicans by the number of Puerto Rican workers already on their way
to the mainland was denied. The Fourth Circuit refused DOL's request
for a stay, but entered an order providing that "available domestic
workers shall not be denied employment." 1 94 The growers nevertheless
refused to hire or quickly fired many of the Puerto Ricans who were
brought to the Northeast apple orchards.1 95 DOL's appeal was not
heard until after the end of the season and was again dismissed as moot.
Again the Fourth Circuit remanded with instructions to the Western
District to "decide promptly whether or not to issue a permanent in-
junction so that, if necessary, this court can resolve the dispute in ample
time for future apple harvests."' 96 Prior to the 1979 harvest, DOL
moved for summary judgment, but Judge Turk never ruled. When
190. No. 77-0092 (W.D. Va. May 3, 1978). Judge Turk concluded that new DOL regula-
tions had mooted the travel advance controversy. But the amendments did not affect the
provisions at issue in the 1977 litigation. See 43 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10315 (March 10, 1978).
Current regulations continue to require that transportation be provided as "commonly pro-
vided by employers in the area of intended employment . . ." 20 C.F.R. § 653.501(d)(5) and
.501(e)(1) (1982). The question at issue in Frederick County I arises every time an interstate job
order is filed.
191. No. 0104 (W.D. Va. April 28, 1978).
192. No. 77-2170 (4th Cir. Nov. 9, 1977).
193. No. 0086 (W.D. Va. June 16, 1980).
194. No. 78-1608, slip op. at 3 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 1978).
195. See supra text accompanying note 158.
196. No. 78-1608, slip op. at 5 (4th Cir. March 20, 1979).
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neither DOL nor the courts penalized the growers for the 1978 fiasco,
the Commonwealth refused to send its workers to the mainland in 1979.
This case was subsequently dismissed as moot, on the ground that the
availability of Puerto Rican workers was no longer an issue. Thus,
Judge Turk again substituted his judgement for that of DOL and INS,
granted the growers all the relief requested, and avoided both appellate
review and final decision on the merits.
This race to the orchards in 1978 lead Puerto Rico to seek declaratory
and injunctive relief against the Virginia apple growers in Puerto Rico v.
Snapp .197 Proceeding paens patn'ae,198 the Commonwealth claimed that
Puerto Rico and its citizens were suffering continuing harm as a result of
the apple growers' concerted refusal to hire Puerto Ricans. Judge Turk
made swift work of the Commonwealth's effort, dismissing the case for
lack of standing. The Fourth Circuit reversed, noting that "deliberate
efforts to stigmatize the labor force as inferior carry a universal sting." 1
In July, 1982, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Fourth Cir-
cuit, holding that Puerto Rico had standing both to defend its residents
"from the harmful effects of discrimination" and to pursue "full and
equal participation in the federal employment service scheme. ' ' 2° °
Finally, tobacco growers in southern Virginia sought the assistance of
the Western District to challenge the "adverse effect wage rate"
(AEWR). In 1980 these growers were certified for over 1,000 Mexican
H-2 workers, based in part on their promise to pay the applicable
AEWR. After the season began, however, they sought in Rowland v. Mar-
shall20 1 to bar enforcement of any minimum wage above the local pre-
vailing wage. Judge Turk granted the relief requested, reducing the
guaranteed earnings for both U.S. and foreign workers by $.31 per hour.
The Fourth Circuit vacated this order, holding that DOL may set an
hourly guarantee above the prevailing rate and that the AEWR is a
reasonable way of doing so. 20 2 Nevertheless, the Virginia tobacco grow-
ers benefitted significantly from Judge Turk's ruling. Roughly $100,000
was deducted from the wages of the Mexican H-2's and held by the
growers for eighteen months, interest free. Further, Judge Turk's deci-
sion demonstrated that H-2 users would receive a warm reception in the
Western District if they challenged a more stringent AEWR methodol-
197. 469 F. Supp. 928 (W.D. Va. 1978), rev'd 632 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1980),af'd 102 S. Ct.
3260 (1982). The Commonwealth filed a companion case against certain New York apple
producers. Puerto Rico v. Bramkamp, 654 F.2d 212 (2nd Cir. 1981), cerl. denied, 102 S. Ct.
3509 (1982).
198. That is, Puerto Rico acted in furtherance of its "quasi-sovereign" interests as guard-
ian of its citizenry. See Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900).
199. 632 F.2d at 370.
200. 102 S. Ct. 3260, 3270 (1982).
201. 650 F.2d 28 (4th Cir. 1981).
202. Id. at 30.
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ogy then being considered by DOL. This type of pressure caused DOL
to delay implementation of the new AEWR, setting the stage for its per-
manent withdrawal by the Reagan Administration.
20 3
These five cases suggest the extent to which the federal judiciary must
share the blame for the debilitated state of the temporary labor certifica-
tion system. With consistent and thoughtful support from the courts,
the Department of Labor might have overcome the many flaws in the
certification structure to shape a workable H-2 program. However, with
the exception of Elton Orchards, Snapp, and Rowland, DOL has received
very little constructive guidance from the federal courts.
V. The Future of the H-2 Program
The 98th Congress is conducting a comprehensive review of U.S. im-
migration law and policy, focusing on the problem of illegal immigra-
tion. One of the central questions in this effort is whether the United
States should establish a system for the lawful admission of contract la-
borers on a large scale, possibly along the lines of the European
"guestworker" programs. In 1981 the Reagan Administration proposed
an experimental guestworker system to admit 50,000 Mexican laborers
annually.2° 4 Other proposals would have established much larger pro-
grams.20 5 However, because broad opposition has made creation of an
entirely new system unlikely, agricultural interests have recently focused
on amendment and expansion of the H-2 program. The following sec-
tions discuss whether the H-2 program should be continued, the revi-
sions which are necessary if it is continued, and the amendments
proposed in the pending legislation.
A. Termination
There is no need for short-term supplementation of the agricultural
workforce through the H-2 program. Only 15,000 to 20,000 additional
203. See 46 Fed. Reg. 32437 (1981). See infra note 223.
204. S. 1765, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., Title VI (1981) reprinted at IMMIGRATION REFORM:
HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON IMMIGRATION, REFUGEES, AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1073, 1080-82 (1981). Under
the Reagan Administration proposal the Mexican guestworkers would have been admitted
for up to twelve months of employment with a designated employer. The governor of each
state would have determined whether his state participated in the program and, if so, identi-
fied the industries or occupations to be involved. Id at § 601 (b) (1). The guestworkers would
have been assigned to employers by the governor on a first-come, first-served basis. Id
205. "I am proposing that each year for five years temporary worker visas be issued for up
to one million Mexican nationals every year." TEMPORARY WORKERS: HEARINGS BEFORE
THE SUBCOMM. ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE Poucv OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (October 22, 1981) (statement of Senator S.I. Hayakawa
discussing S. 930, 97th Cong., 1st Sess (1981)).
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U.S. workers are needed in apples, sugarcane, and other H-2 crops to
eliminate the use of foreign labor. This number is miniscule in terms of
the overall farm workforce (1.8 million hired workers), 2° 6 the number of
migrant farmworkers (at least 800,000 workers including dependents),
20 7
the rate of unemployment among farmworkers (16.4 percent) 208 or any
other measure of the labor pool already available in the United States.
Moreover, illegal entry adds an estimated 500,000 permanent residents
to the U.S. workforce annually, while at least one million undocu-
mented aliens come to this country on a temporary basis each year.2
0 9
Most of these aliens are seeking work and many are experienced in agri-
culture. This influx cannot be halted in the near future without severe
penalties on employers and draconian border enforcement, neither of
which is likely in the current political and fiscal climate.2 10 Thus the
supply of farm labor is large and increasing. But the demand for farm
labor is decreasing. Agriculture is the only major employment sector
expected to experience an absolute decline in the number of jobs during
the 1980's.211
The real issue is not labor availability, but employment standards.
Current H-2 users could satisfy their labor needs without this program if
their wages and employment practices were brought up to 20th century
standards. The H-2 program allows a few favored agricultural employ-
ers to avoid this painful process by recruiting a workforce from another
economic and social era.
H-2 users defend this program by criticizing the skill of U.S. workers.
Apple growers, for example, sometimes claim that U.S. farmworkers are
unable to harvest apples. But picking apples is not significantly differ-
ent from picking grapefruit, oranges, lemons, peaches, pears, cherries,
206. CROP REPORTING BOARD, ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AG-
RICULTURE, FARM LABOR, May 22, 1981, at 1. This figure does not include the 2.6 million
farm operators and unpaid family members. Id
207. PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 1978 MI-
GRANT HEALTH PROGRAM TARGET POPULATION ESTIMATES 3 (1980).
208. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE EMPLOYMENT SITUA-
TION (Feb. 1983).
209. Memorandum from David Hiller, Special Ass't to the Attorney General, to the Presi-
dent's Task Force On Immigration Policy, at 18 (May 19, 1981).
210. The two principal immigration bills considered by Congress in the last two years
purport to penalize employers who knowingly hire aliens illegally in this country, but neither
would establish a meaningful enforcement mechanism. The Reagan Administration's Omni-
bus Immigration Control Act, S. 1765, supra note 204, would have permitted employers to
establish a "good faith" defense by viewing an applicant's birth certificate, driver's license, or
social security card-all of which are easily forgeable. The Immigration Reform and Control
Act, supra note 9, would, at least for the foreseeable future, similarly immunize employers as
long as "the document reasonably appears on its face to be genuine." Id at § 101.
211. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK
HANDBOOK, 1982-83, at Charts 8 & 10 (1982).
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and other tree crops now harvested by tens of thousands of workers re-
cruited from within the United States. Farmworkers who have worked
in tree corps, as well as many able-bodied persons who have not done
any farm labor, could learn to pick apples if provided training and en-
couragement. The growers simply prefer that this work be performed
under conditions acceptable only to a hand-picked foreign workforce.
2 1 2
Growers also argue that the H-2 program protects the consumer against
increased fruit and vegetable costs. But the field labor component in the
price of farm produce is small, 21 3 and there is little reason to believe that
any wage reductions are passed on to the consumer. H-2 users paying
lower wages than their non-user neighbors may simply continue to sell
at the going rate.
In no other industry are employers permitted to engage in mass im-
portation of aliens in direct competition with U.S. workers. Yet without
union representation or significant political power, farmworkers cannot
protect themselves. The H-2 program also legitimizes exploitation of
aliens. Many Jamaicans, Mexicans, and other foreign nationals want to
work in the United States and will do so under the H-2 program if nec-
essary. But it does not follow that the United States should admit these
workers under any conditions they will accept. The United States has
the right, and the duty, to enforce humane employment conditions
within its borders. U.S. immigration policy has traditionally opposed
contract labor programs in part because they create a legal subclass
which is denied the rights accorded "first-class" citizens. Yet H-2 work-
ers are admitted to the U.S. under terms which place them outside the
scope of most employment-related legal protections.
The use of H-2 workers in agriculture should be phased out over a
five-year period. This would allow the affected growers to shift gradu-
ally to a domestic workforce or to become more capital intensive. Some
H-2 users may not be able to remain in operation if compelled to com-
pete for U.S. workers. For such employers the H-2 program is an indi-
rect federal subsidy, supporting inefficient or otherwise non-competitive
212. A study of productivity in the Champlain Valley of New York over a five-year pe-
riod showed that U.S. migrant workers were more productive on an hourly basis than the
Jamaican H-2 workers, but that the H-2's were willing to work more hours. Local workers
were less productive and worked fewer hours than the U.S. migrants or the Jamaicans. D.
Fisher, Labor Productivity of Apple Harvest Workers In the Champlain Valley: 1970-1975,
at 4-8 and Tables A-l, A-3, A-4, and A-6 (July, 1977) (Dep't of Agricultural Economics,
Cornell U.).
213. Eg., Northeastern apple pickers receive approximately $0.45 for each 30 lb. apple
box filled or roughly $0.015 per pound. Apples are sold at 10 to 20 times that figure in retail
outlets. Cf Rinehart Orchards, Inc., Clearance Order No. 4060978 (June 2, 1982) (offering
$0.45 per box in Maryland apple harvest) with The Washington Post, March 11, 1983, A1O
(apples advertised by retail outlet at $0.22 per pound).
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business operations. If Congress believes that financial support of these
producers is in the public interest, a direct subsidy program should be
established.21 4 In any event there is no rational basis for subsidizing
these firms at the expense of the most disadvantaged U.S. workers.
B. Revision of the H-2 Program
If the H-2 program is continued on any scale, major reforms are re-
quired. Many of these changes follow directly from the problems identi-
fied in Section IV.215 This section outlines the more complex statutory
or administrative revisions required to limit the H-2 program to true
labor shortages, prevent depression of U.S. working conditions, and pro-
tect the H-2 workers.
1. Government Control of Foreign Recruitment
No certification system can compel good faith U.S. recruitment as
long as the alternative is wholly unfettered foreign recruitment. The
grower's control over the contract workers should be offset by direct gov-
ernment participation in recruitment, hiring, and transportation of the
214. The sugarcane producers are already heavily subsidized through strict quotas on the
importation of foreign sugar. See 19 U.S.C. § 1821(a) and Presidential Proclamation No.
4941, 47 Fed. Reg. 19,661 (1982). This costs U.S. consumers "approximately $3 billion a
year." The Washington Post, June 6, 1982, at A6, col. 1 (quoting Rep. Peter A. Peyser, D-
N.Y.). Thus, the sugarcane companies are twice favored, ie., the government protects them
against competition from inexpensive sugar produced abroad (including sugar produced in
Jamaica) and permits them to import inexpensive foreign labor.
215. Eg., (i) the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act should be
amended to cover foreign contract workers; (ii) employers should be required to offer trans-
portation advances and family housing; (iii) DOL should end manipulation of piece rates and
productivity requirements; (iv) H-2 users should be required to pay the costs of the recruit-
ment and monitoring efforts of the employment service; and (v) the INS regulations should be
amended to protect H-2's as well as U.S. workers against the use of other H-2's as strikebreak-
ers.
Further, the tax rewards encouraging the use of H-2's should be eliminated. The exclusion
of H-2 wages from the social security (FICA) tax should be replaced by a provision requiring
H-2 workers and their employers to pay into a fund established for this purpose. Upon depar-
ture from the United States, each H-2 worker should be paid the entire amount credited to
his account. Similarly, the exclusion of H-2 wages from the unemployment insurance
(FUTA) tax should be deleted. The FUTA provisions ensure that the burden of unemploy-
ment will be shared by all industries. Conversely, the system recognizes that maintaining
consumer purchasing power during periods of high unemployment is of benefit to all busi-
nesses. For these reasons the unemployment insurance system has never recognized a connec-
tion between a particular employee's future eligibility and an employer's obligation to pay
taxes. To continue the exclusion for H-2 wages also unfairly discriminates against employers
who use only U.S. workers, for these growers incur higher labor costs than their neighbors
who use H-2's. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, UNEMPLOY-
MENT COMPENSATION: FINAL REPORT 27 (1980). The FUTA exemption for wages paid to
H-2 workers is a temporary provision which must be renewed periodically. Congress should
refuse to extend this provision beyond its current termination date of January 1, 1984.
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foreign workforce. 216 However, because this seems politically unattaina-
ble for the foreseeable future, reform efforts must focus on obtaining
better control of the existing private recruitment system. Formal gov-
ernment-to-government agreements with the sending nations should
specify standards and procedures to govern recruitment practices, trans-
portation arrangements, performance criteria, and many other issues
not adequately addressed in the regulations. 21 7 Recruitment should not
be permitted in a nation which has not executed and honored such an
agreement. Enforcement costs, including supervision by U.S. personnel
in the sending countries, should be borne by the employers.
2. Mandatoy Department of Labor Certiftation
If contract workers are to be admitted only when U.S. workers are not
available, the government must be able to defend its finding on "availa-
bility" against political interference. The H-2 program can best be
strengthened against this type of pressure by ending the ambiguous par-
ticipation of INS. Section 214(c) should be amended to provide that
foreign workers may be admitted only if DOL certifies a need for these
workers. An analogous change was made in the permanent labor certifi-
cation provisions in 1965, so that no alien seeking permanent admission
primarily for the purpose of employment may be admitted "unless the
Secretary of Labor has determined and certified" that no U.S. workers
are available. 2 18 Similar language should be inserted in § 214(c).
3. Removal of the Ceding on Working Conditions
DOL should abandon its use of the minimum employment terms as a
"ceiling" and permit farmworkers to negotiate for better employment
conditions.2 19 No agricultural employer should be certified without first
establishing that (i) negotiations with U.S. workers have identified a
wage level at which a sufficient number of workers would accept this
work and (ii) the employer could not remain in business if compelled to
216. This was done during World War II, see supra note 14, and during the bracero pro-
gram, see supra note 35.
217. The intergovernmental agreement should also cover (i) negotiation of the work con-
tract; (ii) issuance of exit papers; (iii) processing of complaints; (iv) imposition of additional
costs or deductions; (v) discharge procedures; (vi) legal representation in the United States;
and (vii) repatriation procedures.
218. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (Supp. IV 1980). See Rodino, 7he Impact Of Immtgration On
The American Labor Market, 27 RUTGERS L. REv. 245, 253 (1974).
219. DOL should specifically recognize and encourage the efforts of the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico to protect its migrant farmworkers. See supra text accompanying note 155.
Although Puerto Rican workers are U.S. citizens, the distance from their homeland and their
inability to speak English makes them especially vulnerable to exploitation. Public Law 87 is
an effort by the Commonwealth to stabilize a potentially chaotic recruitment situation by
supplementing and improving the H-2 certification process.
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pay this wage.220 Such a provision would acknowledge that H-2 users
are receiving a subsidy which should be available, if at all, only after a
showing of financial need. The market would play a greater role under
this approach than under the existing system, because the forces of sup-
ply and demand would ordinarily determine the job terms. A signifi-
cant, one-time increase in wages might result, but only to the point
where earnings become competitive with earnings in comparable agri-
cultural or nonagricultural employment.
22'
4. Revision of the Adverse Effect Wage Rate
If DOL continues to use the H-2 minimums as a ceiling, these terms
must be dramatically improved. The Carter Administration moved in
this direction in 1981 by publishing a single, nationwide AEWR, based
on the actual average hourly earnings of all piece-rate agricultural work-
ers.22 2 The weakness in this approach was political. That is, DOL was
portrayed as imposing a special minimum wage for all of agriculture.
This weakness proved fatal when the Reagan Administration withdrew
the new methodology within days of taking office.
223
DOL can provide the same protection by other means. The Carter
Administration proposal began with the broadest possible base figure,
but it is equally feasible to begin at the other end of the spectrum, with
the piece rates actually being paid in the specific area and crop at issue.
Any AEWR must at least (i) ensure that no employer obtains H-2 work-
ers without offering a wage equal to the highest wage offered by his
neighbors and (ii) correct for the salary depression resulting from the
presence of H-2 workers. These goals could be attained by calculating
the AEWR in two steps. First, a "base rate" should be identified. This
would be the piece rate paid in the local area and crop during the prior
season to the domestic worker at the 90th percentile in terms of rates.
2 24
220. That is, the grower should be required to pay the lower of (i) the wage which is
sufficient to satisfy his labor needs or (ii) the highest wage which he can provide and still
remain in business.
221. Hourly earnings in the H-2 crops are well below earnings in other outdoor manual
jobs. In the apple regions of New York State the average hourly earnings of domestic workers
in 1980 were $4.89 (Hudson Valley), $4.16 (Champlain Valley), and $6.87 (Western New
York). Ste supra note 179. Unskilled laborers in construction work were guaranteed $11.20 in
Albany, $10.65 in New York City, $10.63 in Syracuse, and $10.00 in Rochester (July, 1981
figures). U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics News Release No. 81-381 (August 4,
1981), at Table 3. In Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Richmond, all potential labor-sending
areas for the Northeast apple harvest, construction laborers averaged $8.80, $9.80, and $7.00
respectively. Id
222. 46 Fed. Reg. 4568 (1981).
223. 46 Fed. Reg. 32437 (1981).
224. DOL already gathers information on the various piece rates being paid in many
markets, in order to set the "prevailing rate." The prevailing rate is, by DOL definition, the
rate paid to forty percent of the domestic workforce or to the worker at the median (51st
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Second, the base rate would be increased in proportion to the penetra-
tion of the market by H-2 workers (e.g., by .5 percent for each one per-
cent of market penetration) . 2 5  This approach to the AEWR is
conceptually straightforward, tied to the wages actually paid for the rel-
evant job, and immune from criticism for imposing a single wage on all
farm employers. Most importantly, the AEWR would have its greatest
impact in the areas of greatest H-2 penetration and would provide a
strong incentive to decrease reliance on H-2 workers.
226
5. Tightening the Domestic Recruitment Process
The H-2 regulations should be amended to require that recruitment
begin earlier, when U.S. migrants can be reached in Florida, Texas, and
the other homebase states. Further, to ensure that the various rulings
along the path to certification are made without delay, the regulations
should incorporate the following processing deadlines: (i) the job order
must be filed six months before the harvest; (ii) DOL must accept or
reject the order within two weeks of submission; (iii) if the order is re-
jected, the employer must, within two weeks, amend the order to DOL's
satisfaction or file suit; and (iv) DOL must ensure that the job informa-
tion is available in the supply state offices within two weeks of the date
the order is accepted. Adherence to this timetable would ensure that the
job orders are either made available to U.S. workers or brought before
the courts at least four and one-half months before the harvest.
In 1977 DOL proposed that job orders be submitted ninety days
before the harvest, but even this modest change was abandoned when
the growers argued that "it was not possible to estimate their labor
needs so far in advance. ' '227 This objection is neither correct nor suffi-
cient. The traditional H-2 users import virtually the same number of
contract workers each year,2 28 and thus could make an accurate esti-
percentile). U.S. EMPLOYMENT SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT SERVICE MAN-
UAL, PART III, § 6612 (1981).
225. There is no way to determine the exact degree of wage depression caused by the use
of H-2 workers. In this sense the adjustment formula offered here is arbitrary. However,
because this approach is based on the wage structure in the local market and is tied directly to
the degree of penetration, it is more defensible than alternative measures such as reference to
wages in comparable markets where H-2's are not used, reference to wages in other crops in
the same area, or reference to trends in non-agricultural wages.
226. The methodology suggested here is consistent with Williams v. Usury, 531 F.2d 305
(5th Cir. 1976), in which the Fifth Circuit rejected the claim that the Secretary of Labor must
set the AEWR at the wage level required to attract an entirely domestic workforce. The
purpose of the proposed methodology is to offset wage depression caused by the use of H-2's
and prevent further deflation. These are permitted functions of the AEWR. 531 F.2d at 306-
307. If U.S. workers cannot be recruited at the wage established after the correction for the
past use of H-2's, the employer would be free to use foreign labor again. The wage which
might be sufficient to attract U.S. workers is irrelevant to this analysis.
227. 43 Fed. Reg. 10306, 10307 (March 10, 1978).
228. During the last five years the number of H-2's admitted for Florida sugarcane has
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mate of their labor needs six months before the harvest. Moreover, the
exact number of workers need not be determined at the outset. Employ-
ers should be allowed to change the number of aliens requested by
twenty-five percent three months before the harvest. This would allow
the job orders to be circulated much earlier while providing flexibility.
The regulations should also provide for piecemeal certification. Two
months before the harvest DOL would grant certification for fifty per-
cent of the positions not yet filled. Two weeks before the harvest DOL
would again certify for fifty percent of the openings not filled by U.S.
workers (or previously certified to foreign workers). Three days after the
beginning of the season, DOL would make its final certification deci-
sion, reflecting the number of U.S. workers hired at the last moment as
well as the U.S. workers recruited earlier but failing to appear.229 Such
a timetable would end the last-second, "all or nothing" nature of the
existing certification system.
6. Post-Admission Supervision and Enforcement
The Department of Labor should be given unambiguous responsibil-
ity for supervising the treatment of U.S. and foreign workers by H-2
employers. DOL must then aggressively pursue complaints, conduct
systematic inspections in the fields and camps, audit payroll records,
and interview workers after the season. To back up this responsibility,
DOL should be given a range of sanctions not tied to the certification
decision. For example, the Secretary of Labor should have authority to
sue for back wages on behalf of workers not paid the adverse effect wage
rate and to levy fines for violations of other H-2 guarantees.
Even without new authority, DOL could gain greater control over the
post-admission aspects of the H-2 program through more flexible use of
its power to deny certification. DOL should institute a system of "par-
tial certifications" to restrict recalcitrant growers to a percentage of the
workers admitted the previous season. Similarly, aggressive use of "con-
ditional certifications" could compel H-2 users to either correct abuses
or forego future certification. 2 30 Sanctions of this type would impose
never varied more than four percent from the preceeding year. LABOR CERTIFICATIONS
GRANTED, supra note 73, at Table III. During this period the number of H,2's certified for
the apple harvest only once varied more than nine percent from the preceeding year. Id
229. This piecemeal certification system would guarantee that the employer obtains sev-
enty-five percent of his requested workforce at the beginning of the harvest and the remaining
twenty-five percent within ten to twenty days thereafter. This matches the ordinary harvest
schedule, since the peak harvest period is usually several weeks after the first workers are
needed.
230. DOL has recently attempted to condition future certification on payment of"restitu-
tion" in the form of the wages due. See, e.g., Donaldson v. TrirCounty Labor Camp, Inc. No.
82-TAE-00003 (May 5, 1983). However, most of these efforts are still entangled in DOL's
labyrinthian administrative complaint process. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 658.400-.504 (1982).
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credible penalties without inviting judicial intervention by threatening
the harvest.
C. The Immigration Reform and Control Act
Senator Alan K. Simpson and Representative Romano L. Mazzoli,
chairmen of the respective immigration subcommittees, reintroduced
the Immigration Reform and Control Act in February, 1983.231 This
bill seeks to control illegal immigration through increased border en-
forcement, penalties for employers hiring illegal aliens ("employer sanc-
tions"), a legalization program for aliens already in the United States,
and new procedures for handling refugees. As originally submitted in
the 97th Congress, the Simpson-Mazzoli package would have made only
minor changes in the H-2 program. 23 2 However, grower representatives,
supported by the Reagan Administration, have pressed for major
amendments to ease access to foreign workers. Many of these amend-
ments have been incorporated in the current versions of the bill:
Restricted Recruitment: Section 101(a)(15)(H)(ii) provides that foreign
labor may be admitted only if no U.S. workers are available "in this
country. '2 33 Both the House and Senate version of the pending bill
would delete the phrase "in this country," on the ground that growers
should not be required to recruit in every state. But the existing lan-
guage has never required nationwide recruitment. DOL sends the job
orders (at no cost to the grower) to the states surrounding the job site
and to a small number of other states thought to have available U.S.
workers. Deleting this phrase would encourage growers to contest efforts
to circulate the job orders outside the state of employment, especially
where there is no established pattern of interstate recruitment through
the employment service. It is difficult to understand why farm jobs in
the United States should be offered to workers in Jamaica and Mexico
but not to domestic migrants in Florida and Texas.
DOL "Ceihngs": The original Simpson-Mazzoli bill did not address
the question of whether U.S. workers can be deemed "unavailable"
Research has revealed only one case in which U.S. workers actually received monetary pay-
ment for back wages in connection with a conditional denial of certification. See Secretary of
Labor v. Chick Orchards, Inc., ETA No. 1 (1980).
231. S. 529, supra note 6; H.R. 1510, supra note 6. The Simpson-Mazzoli bill passed the
Senate on August 17, 1982, 128 CONG. Rac. 10618-19, but died on the House floor in the
final days of the 97th Congress. As introduced in February, 1983, S. 529 is identical to the bill
passed by the Senate in the 97th Congress; likewise, H.R. 1510 is substantively the same as
the bill reported favorably by the Judiciary Committee in late 1982.
232. See, e.g., H.R. 5872, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., § 211 (1982).
233. 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(15)(H)(ii) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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when they seek wages above the DOL minimums. Both the House and
Senate versions now incorporate DOL's administrative interpretation
setting a "ceiling" on what U.S. workers can demand.
234
Hiring Restrictions: Under current regulations a grower must continue
to hire any U.S. worker who appears at the job site during the first half
of the season. The pending bills would terminate the grower's obliga-
tion at the time the foreign workers leave for the United States.2 35 Be-
cause this is often seven to ten days before the season begins, U.S.
workers who arrive as the season starts could be turned away.
Rulemaking Authority: The pending bills give the Attorney General-
not the Secretary of Labor-final control over the certification regula-
tions.236 This substantially weakens DOL's control of the certification
process.
Able, Willing and Qualified Workers: Both the House and Senate bills
would insert language emphasizing that employers have no obligation
to hire workers unless they are "able, willing, qualified. '23 7 This
amendment would reinforce employer efforts to turn away all but the
most able U.S. workers.
Employer Liability: The original Simpson-Mazzoli bill would have au-
thorized DOL to certify H-2's to an association of employers if (i) the
employment was to be in one crop and (ii) the grower remains liable for
compliance with the petition. This would be consistent with existing
practice. However, the current Senate version eliminates both of these
requirements. This would encourage growers to immunize themselves
from liability for the treatment of the foreign workers by creating labor
contracting associations to import foreign workers and move them freely
among various farms and crops.
238
Consultation with USDA: The House version designates the Depart-
234. See, e.g., S. 529, supra note 6, at § 211(b) (the Secretary of Labor shall certify unless
the employer has been referred U.S. workers "who have agreed to perform such labor or
services on the terms and conditions of a job offer which meets the requirements of the Secre-
tary"). See supra text accompanying note 143.
235. See, e.g., S. 529, supra note 6, at § 211(b) (3) (the certification will remain effective
only if the employer continues to accept U.S. workers for employment "until the date the
aliens depart for work with the employer").
236. See, e.g., S. 529, supra note 6, at § 211(d).
237. See, e.g., S. 529, supra note 6, at § 211(b)(3).
238. S. 529, supra note 6, at § 211(b). Such an association would be exempt from the
Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, see supra text accompanying note
109, if it recruited only H-2 workers.
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ment of Agriculture as one of the "appropriate agencies of government"
to be consulted in evaluating petitions for foreign labor.2 39 Coupled
with the withdrawal of DOL's final rulemaking authority, this amend-
ment would substantially transfer control of the H-2 program from the
Labor Department. In effect, the Simpson-Mazzoli bill would carry out
the transfer of authority proposed and rejected in 1965.2
4
0
Reduction of US Recruitment: The House bill would reduce the maxi-
mum domestic recruitment period from eighty to fifty days,241 further
undermining the effort to seek out U.S. workers.
If enacted with these or similar amendments, the Immigration Re-
form and Control Act would create a substantially different H-2 pro-
gram, with even fewer protections for American workers. This
"streamlined" program would become the vehicle for the admission of
several hundred thousand Mexican farmworkers in California, Arizona,
New Mexico, Texas, and other parts of the Southwest.2 42 In short, the
large-scale "guestworker" proposal has not been withdrawn but merely
reshaped to fit the guise of the H-2 program.
Few members of Congress believe that the United States needs addi-
tional unskilled laborers at this time. Indeed, the immigration bill
draws its strongest support from those who feel that the influx of aliens is
"out of control." However, powerful agricultural interests have vowed
to oppose any comprehensive immigration legislation unless provision is
made for easy access to foreign labor. Congress has, to date, given the
Reagan Administration a free hand in rewriting the H-2 provisions to
suit these growers.
Some advocates of an expanded temporary labor program argue that
it will be only temporary, helping farmers make the transition from ille-
gal aliens to domestic labor. But foreign labor programs, both here and
in Europe, have proven to be self-perpetuating. The existing H-2 pro-
gram provides the best evidence against the likelihood of early termina-
239. H.R. 1510, supra note 6, at § 211(b)(3).
240. See supra text accompanying note 44.
241. H.R. 1510, supra note 6, at § 211(b). Delays in certification are in fact a problem,
but "streamlining" the recruitment period is exactly the wrong solution. As noted above,
actual domestic recruitment is already so brief that few U.S. workers learn of the available
work. See supra text accompanying note 148.
242. Attorney General William French Smith has already concluded that growers in the
Southwest will need temporary workers in "significantly larger" numbers than have been
admitted under the H-2 program. Address by Attorney General William French Smith, Cali-
fornia Chamber of Commerce (May 20, 1982). Labor Department officials are gearing up for
the admission of 50,000 agricultural H-2's during the first year of the expanded program and
300,000 annually within three years. Telephone interview with John Hancock, U.S. Employ-
ment Serv., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Washington, D.C. (March 8, 1983).
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tion. Throwing their political strength behind the status quo, a few East
Coast growers have been able to continue using contract workers for
thirty years without any economic justification. If the 98th Congress
enacts the H-2 amendments now in the Simpson-Mazzoli bill, a much




Congress enacted §§ 101 (a) (15) (H) (ii) and 214 (c) to provide a perma-
nent framework for the case-by-case admission of foreign workers to alle-
viate demonstrated labor shortages. The H-2 program has never
fulfilled this intent. H-2 workers are routinely admitted for agricultural
jobs without any meaningful determination of whether qualified U.S.
workers could be found. This program has been an anomaly in U.S.
immigration law, a special interest subsidy serving no purpose other
than to supply a small number of agricultural employers with cheap
foreign labor.
The piecemeal growth of the H-2 program since 1977 and the on-
going efforts to expand the program by legislation have signaled the end
of the tacit agreement forged in 1965. Congress once again must decide
whether the United States should provide for the short-term admission
of contract workers for farm labor. Ideally, Congress would take this
opportunity to terminate the use of contract workers in agriculture.
However, because termination is not politically feasible, the H-2 pro-
gram must be substantially revised, as detailed in Part V above. Con-
gress should emphatically reject the effort to convert the H-2 program
into a massive guestworker system and return the program to its original
goal. The admission of alien contract workers should be a truly excep-
tional remedy, available only to meet unexpected and temporary labor
shortages.
243. Conversely, there is no need for an expanded H-2 program even during a short tran-
sition period, for the Immigration Control and Reform Act is likely to include a special three
year "transitional program" for agricultural employers, wholly apart from the H-2 program.
As favorably reported by the House Judiciary Committee in May, 1983, H.R. 1510 provides
that during the first three years following the effective date of the new law all agricultural
employers may obtain "work permits" from the Attorney General authorizing them to em-
ploy 100%, 67% and 33%, respectively of the undocumented aliens traditionally employed.
See H.R. 1510, supra note 6, at § 211(b)(4).
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